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INTRODUCTION
Britain is one of the most secretive democracies in the world to-
day.' The results of health checks on cruise liners,2 the length of the
queue at the local post office,3 and inspections of British pharmaceu-
tical plants are all considered official secrets.' Since the 1970s, the
1. See 219 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 584 (1993) (statement of Mark Fisher)
[hereinafter Fisher Arguments] ("Britain is still one of the most secretive societies
in the western world and one of the few democracies not to have some form of
freedom of information legislation."); see also Des Wilson, 1984 ... and On-
wards? The Level and Effects of Secrecy in Britain Today, in THE SECRETS FILE:
THE CASE FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN BRITAIN TODAY 1, 1-12 (Des Wilson
ed., 1984) (stating that Britain is "probably the most secretive" of democracies
while advocating for greater freedom of information in Britain today). See gener-
ally CLIVE PONTING, SECRECY IN BRITAIN (1990) (discussing the extent and nature
of official secrecy in Britain).
2. See Richard Norton-Taylor, Secret Society: Bill Would Open Whitehall
Closet, GUARDIAN, Feb. 19, 1993, at 9 (stating that reports of cockroaches found
in the cruise ship QE2's kitchens in 1989 and 1991 were available in the United
States under its Freedom of Information Act but were not available in Britain un-
der its secrecy laws).
3. See 219 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 635 (1993) (statement of Kate Hoey)
[hereinafter Hoey Arguments] (citing the length of the queue at her local post of-
fice as an example of an official secret).
4. See Norton-Taylor, supra note 2, at 9 (describing how Britons use the
United States Freedom of Information Act to learn about inspections of British
pharmaceutical and poultry plants). "By using the United States' Freedom of In-
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United States,5 Canada,6 Australia 7 and many other countries' have
introduced a freedom of information law9 that grants statutory rights
formation Act, Britons can find more about British policy from the U.S. than from
British archives." Id
5. See OFFICE OF INFO. AND PRIVACY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT GUIDE & PRIVACY ACT OVERVIEW (Sept. ed. 1996) [hereinaf-
ter FOIA GUIDE] (noting that Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552, in 1966). Congress amended the act extensively in 1974 and 1996.
See id; see also Congress Enacts FOA Amendments, FOIA UPDATE, (DOJ/Office
of Info. and Privacy, D.C.) Fall 1996, at 1 [hereinafter FOIA UPDATE] (detailing
"Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996"); infra note 351
and accompanying text (providing the United States' amended Freedom of Infor-
mation Act's new definition of agency records).
6. See generally STANDING COMM. ON JUSTICE AND SOLICITOR GENERAL,
33RD PARL., 2D SESS., OPEN AND SHUT: ENHANCING THE RIGHT TO KNOW AND THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY, REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF THE ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT
AND THE PRIVACY ACT (March, 1987) [hereinafter OPEN & SHUT] (detailing the
date of enactment of Canada's Access to Information Act and explaining the stat-
ute's roots in the late 1960s and 1970s). Specifically, Canada's Access to Informa-
tion Act, RS.C., ch. 111 (1980-1983) (Can.), was enacted by Parliament in June
1982 and came into force in July 1983. See id at 2-3; see also infra note 335 and
accompanying text (stating that Liberals enacted Canada's Access to Information
Act as a result of pressure from the Conservative opposition party).
7. See generally AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM'N & ADMIN. REVIEW
COUNCIL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION, ISSUES PAPER No. 12, at 3-8 (1994) [here-
inafter ISSUES PAPER] (explaining how Australia's FOI legislation was finally
passed in 1982 despite the fact that it was first considered in the 1960s, following
the introduction of FOI legislation in the United States). Australia's Freedom of
Information Act, 1982, ch. 3 (Cth), was specifically enacted in December 1982,
and substantively amended in 1983, 1986, and 1991. See id at 6. On July 8, 1994,
Acting Attorney-General of Australia, Duncan Kerr MP, asked the Australian Law
Reform Commission (ALRC) and the Administrative Review Council (ARC) to
review the Commonwealth's freedom of information (FOI) legislation to deter-
mine if further reform was necessary. See id at 1; see also infra note 343 and ac-
companying text (discussing the Acting Attorney General's Order to the ALRC to
conduct its FOI inquiry).
8. See Tom Riley, News From Canada and Abroad, ACCESS REPORTS, June
9, 1993, at 9 (noting that Manitoba's Freedom of Information Act came into force
in 1988); see also IAN EAGLES ET AL., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN NEW
ZEALAND 1-3 (1992) (observing that freedom of information became a political
issue in New Zealand in the mid-1970s, which led to a review of the country's Of-
ficial Secrets Act and the enactment of the "Official Information Act" on Decem-
ber 17, 1982); cf Tom Riley, News From Canada and Abroad, ACCESS REPORTS,
Sept. 28, 1994, at 5 [hereinafter September Report] (affirming the news of a draft
freedom of information bill in India). Tom Riley also reports that "[i]n early 1994
the European Commission brought into effect its Code of Conduct on Access to
government information." Id at 4. The Code applies to all European Commission
Institutions, not to any member country. See id
9. See PATRICK BIRKINSHAW, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: THE LAW, THE
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of access to the above information. Britain, however, has opted for
new secrecy legislation instead."°
Pledging to curtail the excessive government secrecy that exists in
Britain, Prime Minister Tony Blair included a Freedom of Informa-
tion Act in the New Labour Party's 1997 election manifesto. He
stated: "We are pledged to a Freedom of Information Act, leading to
more open government. . . ." " On the first of May, 1997, the British
electorate demonstrated its preference for Blair and freedom of in-
formation legislation at the polls, allowing Blair to capture a com-
manding majority in the Parliament. 2
PRACTICE AND THE IDEAL 1 (2nd ed. 1996) (defining freedom of information as
"having access to files, or to information in any form, in order to know what the
government is up to"); see also Richard A. Chapman, Introduction to OPEN
GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF THE PROSPECTS OF OPEN GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE
LIMITATIONS OF THE BRITISH POLITICAL SYSTEM I I (Richard A. Chapman & Mi-
chael Hunt eds., 1987) (advancing basic principles underlying freedom of informa-
tion legislation). Three basic principles are: (1) Disclosure of official information
as a right; (2) Exemptions prohibiting the release of certain kinds of information
deemed necessary to be kept secret in the nation's interests; and (3) Machinery for
appeal against denials by administrators to supply information. See id. In general,
freedom of information laws grant rights of access to government held documents,
except for certain categories of information which are protected from disclosure by
statutory exemptions. See infra Part III (detailing the access statutes of the United
States, Canada and Australia).
10. In 1989, Britain's "Official Secrets Act" was amended yet again. See Offi-
cial Secrets Act, 1989, ch. 6 (Eng.) [hereinafter OSA 1989]; see also infra notes
31-32 (discussing the Official Secrets Act amendments of 1989). See generally
Michael Cassell, Fears of Severe Curbs on Freedom of Expression; Official Se-
crets Act, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 20, 1988, at A 10 (discussing the severe curbs
on freedom that the "Government's new official secrets laws" have in Britain).
11. New Labour, Because Britain Deserves Better: The Manifesto (visited Nov.
3, 1997) <http://www.labour.org.uk/views/manifesto/britain/politics%5F1.html>
[hereinafter New Labour].
12. See Fawn Vrazo, Britain's Historic 'Ta-Ta' to the Tories, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), May 4, 1997, at A25 (stating that the "Labor Party
didn't just win the general election Thursday, it swallowed it whole ... Labor
leader Tony Blair and his party ended 18 years straight of Conservative rule");
Toasting the Tories, STAR TELEGRAM (Fort Worth, TX), May 6, 1997, at 10 (stat-
ing "[t]here is winning, and then there is kicking the tea and crumpets out of the
opposition .... [T]he latter is what the Labor Party did to the Conservative Party
in the recent British elections"); David S. Broder, After Victory, The Job Begins
Across the Ocean, Clinton's Record Shadows Blair, REC. (Northern New Jersey),
May 5, 1997, at A15 (comparing the electoral success of Tony Blair to United
States President Clinton and emphasizing how Blair, like Clinton, competed suc-
cessfully for "information-age" votes).
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Blair promised a White Paper on proposals for a freedom of in-
formation bill during the Queen's Speech at the opening of Parlia-
ment." The lack of an identifiable time table for a bill, however, has
led many to question the New Labour Party's commitment. 4 Since
1974, a Freedom of Information Act has permeated Labour manifes-
tos, only to be dropped once the Party was in power." The govern-
13. Queen's Speech on the Opening of Parliament, Wed May 14, 1997 (visited
Aug. 3, 1997) <http://lvww.open.gov.uk/coitqs97/speech.html>. In general, a
white paper is an official government report prepared on any subject.
14. See Ann Clwyd, End Secrecy Before It's Too Late Again, GUARDIAN, May
20, 1997, at 17 (lamenting that a Freedom of Information Act is not among the
measures the Labor Party has brought forward in the first session of Parliament
and arguing that "[i]f we wait two or three years before legislating, ministers will
have slipped into the traditional, cosy, protected way of making decisions");
Leader: Don't Keep us in the Dark, INDEP., May 11, 1997, at 22 [hereinafter
Leader] (stating that "the absence of a freedom of information Bill is disappoint-
ig" and asking whether the Government regards people's involvement in politics
as being restricted to periodic elections). But see Nicholas Timmins, Delay on
Freedom of Information, FIN. TIMES (London), May 15, 1997, at 10 (noting that
Mr. David Clark, the Chanchellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, has assured that "the
government was 'deadly serious' about enacting such a bill"); infra note 16.
15. See Clwyd, supra note 14, at 17 (reiterating that "[s]ince 1974, the Labour
Party has committed itself to freedom of information in manifesto after mani-
festo"); Fiona Cairns, Mandelson: Freedom of Information Bill Still On, EVENING
STANDARD, May 8, 1997, at A2 (detailing how "[i]n the past, under the leadership
of Harold Wilson and Jim Callaghan, Labour promised Freedom of Information
legislation-only to drop the idea once in government"); see also The Labour
Party General Election Manifesto for 1974, reprinted in THE TIMES GUIDE TO THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS OCTOBER 1974 309 (1974) (stating that "Labour believes
that the process of government should be more open to the public .... We shall:
Replace the Official Secrets Act by a measure to put the burden on the public
authorities to justify withholding information."); The Labour Party General Elec-
tion Manifesto for 1983, reprinted in THE TIMES GUIDE TO THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS JUNE 1983 304, 325 (promising to "[i]ntroduce a Freedom of Informa-
tion Bill, providing for a genuine system of open government and placing the onus
on the authorities to justify withholding information"). See generally DAVID
BUTLER, BRITISH GENERAL ELECTIONS SINCE 1945 (2d ed. 1995) (detailing the
fourteen general elections that have occurred in Britain since 1945). General Par-
liamentary elections must be held at least every five years. See id The Labour
Party has won seven general elections since 1945 and the Conservative Party has
won eight. See id In order to clearly understand the pattern of the British Govern-
ment's opposition to freedom of information and Labour's attempts, as demon-
stated throughout the text it is necessary to have a detailed timeline of the Gov-
ernments of Britain. The timeline is as follows: 1959-64- The Conservative
Government of Harold MacMillan; 1964-66; The Labour Governments of Harold
Wilson; 1966-74- The Conservative Government of Edward Heath; 1974-76-
The Labour Government of Harold Wilson; 1976-79- The Labour Government
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ment claimed that the delay was due to its desire to ensure full con-
sultation on such a complex issue. 6
This comment discusses what makes the enactment of freedom of
information legislation so complex in the United Kingdom at the na-
tional level. Freedom of information and open government are con-
sidered part of an effective democracy. Secrecy breeds inefficiency,
lack of accountability, and a general distrust for government. Free-
dom of information statutes are important because they dismantle
governmental secrecy by granting individuals access to information.
Part I provides an overview of the secret culture of Britain's govern-
ment. Part II examines prior attempts to enact freedom of informa-
tion legislation in Britain. Part III outlines the access statutes of the
United States, Australia, and Canada as prototypes for Britain. Fi-
nally, Part IV recommends provisions that should be included in
Blair's Freedom of Information Act.
of James Callaghan; 1979-92- The Conservative Governments of Margaret
Thatcher; 1992-97- The Conservative Government of John Major; and 1997-
present- The Labour Government of Tony Blair. See ALAN SKED & CHRIS COOK,
POSTWAR BRITAIN: A POLITICAL HISTORY (2d ed. 1984) (tracing the Governments
of Britain).
16. Commitment to Freedom of Information Bill and More Open Government
Reaffirmed (Cabinet Office Press Release of 14 May 1997) (visited Nov. 8, 1997)
<http://www.coi.gov.uk/coi> [hereinafter Cabinet Office]; see Leader, supra note
14 (providing Minister without Portfolio Peter Mandelson's argument as to the
delay of a freedom of information bill which was that "Labour 'can't just pull
some Bill from the shelf and implement it."'); see also Freedom of Information
Unit (visited Aug. 3, 1997) <http://www.open.gov.uk/m-of-g/foihome.html>
[hereinafter FOI Unit] (setting forth the Government's freedom of information
legislation schedule). "[T]he Government hopes to publish [a] White Paper this
Summer [1997] and to publish a draft bill for consultation early next year [1998]."
Id The British Government failed to publish a White Paper during the Summer of
1997; however, to a certain extent, it has advanced its short term goal of "looking
at ways in which the existing Code of Practice can best be used to extend openness
in the short term." Id. Recently, the Lord Chancellor's Department published fur-
ther information on Open Government, entitled "Open Government - Provision of
Information." See Open Government-Provision of Information (visited Nov. 8,
1997) <http://www.open.gov.uk/lcd/open.html> (stating on Nov. 6, 1997 that [t]he
Government is committed to a Freedom of Information Act .... Pending the in-
troduction of such an act, the Lord Chancellor's Department is committed to pro-
viding information in line with the principles laid down in the Code of Practice on
Access to Government Information").
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I. BACKGROUND
A. THE SECRET CULTURE OF BRITAIN'S GOVERNMENT
Unlike many other parliamentary democracies," Britain does not
operate under a written constitution that sets forth the responsibilities
and rights of the government and the people.'8 Instead, Britain's law
is comprised of parliamentary statutes, common law and judicial de-
cisions, and tradition.' In the nineteenth century, it was customary
for ministers and civil servants to abide by an internal code of con-
duct for the dissemination of official information."0 The pervasive
underlying premise of this code was that a good government is a
closed government. In other words, the public should know only
what the government decides it should know.2 This concept of gov-
17. See SYDNEY D. BAILEY, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY at viii
(1958) (defining "parliamentary democracy" as "that system of government in
which the rulers are answerable to and dismissible by representatives elected by
the people"); cf David Winder, Little Known British Tradition: Secrecy,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 17, 1986, at 1 (explaining that Britain, in ad-
dition to being the "'mother of Parliaments .... also laid the foundations for repre-
sentative democracy and individual liberty with the signing of the Magna Carta in
1215").
18. See British Information Services, Britain in the USA (visited July 11, 1997)
<http://www.britain.nyc.ny.us/> (differentiating Britain from most other countries
because it does not have a written constitution set out in a single document); cf
Chapman, supra note 9, at 16 (explaining that Britain's unwritten constitution is
the main difference between the United Kingdom and all other countries, as far as
freedom of information legislation is concerned); see, e.g., ROBERT PYPER, THE
BRITISH CIVIL SERVICE 145 (1995) (advancing that the large expanses of the con-
stitution which remain "unwritten" reinforce official secrecy by being "relatively
easy to supplement with codes, rules and conventions"). In addition, Mr. Pyper as-
serts that the lack of any constitutional "right to know" hampers members of the
public and their representatives when seeking access to official information. See
id
19. See British Information Services, supra note 18 (providing internet users
with details as to how Britain is ruled); BAILEY, supra note 17, at 2 (detailing the
"three sources from which the British Constitution is drawn").
20. See PONTING, supra note 1, at 1 ("For most of the nineteenth century Brit-
ain had no laws to enforce secrecy. Control of official information was exercised
through an informal code of conduct among the elite group of politicians and ad-
ministrators who had a strong interest in treating the conduct of public affairs as an
essentially private matter.").
21. See id; see also BIRKINSHAW supra note 9, at 25 (describing how, in Brit-
ain, political power and survival are inextricably bound with the control of infor-
mation). Accordingly, if one takes away the government's control of information,
1997]
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ernmental secrecy was later institutionalized22 by the Official Secrets
Act of 1911.23
1. The Official Secrets Act of 1911
Parliament passed the Official Secrets Act in 1911, with little de-
bate, in response to fears of German espionage.24 The Act combines
espionage offense provisions with provisions on the disclosure of of-
ficial information. 25 Although members of Parliament presented the
bill as a necessary measure to combat espionage and preserve na-
tional security, many have argued that "the bill ... was intended by
the Government to have a wider scope."26 Section two of the Official
of when and what to release, one takes away a bulwark of its power. See id.; see,
e.g., CLIVE PONTING, WHITEHALL: TRAGEDY AND FARCE 133 (1986) (character-
izing the "information" that the government does disclose as "publicity material"
or "public relations material" which masks the real level of secrecy and exposes
the public to information that supports the government's activities). See generally
DAVID LEIGH, FRONTIERS OF SECRECY: CLOSED GOVERNMENT IN BRITAIN at ix
(1982) (maintaining that people with power have a vested interest not only in
hanging on to as much power as possible, but also in obscuring the truth).
22. See Wilson, supra note 1, at 1 (stating that "[g]overnmental secrecy is in-
stitutionalized by the Official Secrets Act"); see also PYPER, supra note 18 (recog-
nizing the Official Secrets Act of 1911 as the most sweeping secrecy statute in
Britain). In addition, Pyper highlights the Thirty Year Rule which is an additional
statute contributing to official secrecy by placing a blanket ban on publication of
official documents for three decades. See id.
23. Official Secrets Act (OSA), 1911 (Eng.) [hereinafter OSA 1911]; see also
951 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1256-61 (1978) (statement of Sir Michael Havers)
[hereinafter Havers Statements] (tracing the history of the Official Secrets Act of
1911). The Official Secrets Act of 1911 was not the first Official Secrets Act to
emerge; rather, Parliament passed the Breach of Official Trust Bill in 1889. See id.
at 1256; see also BIRKINSHAW, supra note 9, at 82 (recounting the historical de-
velopment of government's control of information and noting in particular that
government control of information was not a problem when Parliament passed the
first Official Secrets Act).
24. See PONTING, supra note 1, at 8 (noting that, at the turn of the century,
fears of a German invasion and stories of German spies infiltrating Britain began
to proliferate); see also Havers Statements, supra note 23, at 1257 (describing how
on August 18, 1911, the Bill passed through "all of its stages" and the Attorney
General said that there was "nothing novel in the principle of the Bill").
25. See PONTING, supra note 1, at 9 (asserting that the Government opted for
additional protective cover by combining espionage and disclosure in the same
act).
26. See BIRKINSHAW, supra note 9, at 97-98 (citing Frank Committee, Cmnd
5104, vol. 1 (1972), at 53). The Frank Committee Command Paper reported the
circumstances surrounding the enactment of the OSA of 1911:
478 [13:471
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Secrets Act makes it a criminal offense to disclose official informa-
tion without authority." Under the Act, it is also an offense to receive
such information.2 "It is immaterial whether or not the recipient
subsequently passes on the information."29 As such, a presumption
developed, and continues to exist, whereby all government informa-
tion is presumed official and secret-not to be disclosed." Although
The debates give a clear impression of crisis legislation, aimed mainly at espionage.
Closer study, and reference to official sources, reveal a different story. This legislation
had been long desired by governments. It had been carefully prepared over a period of
years. One of its objects was to give greater protection against leakages of any kind of
official information whether or not connected with defense or national security. This
was clear enough from the text of the Bill alone. Although section two of the Act was
much wider in a number of respects than section two of the 1889 Act, the files suggest
that the Government in 1911 honestly believed that it introduced no new principle, but
merely put into practice more effectually the principle of using criminal sanctions to
protect official information. At all events, the Government elected not to volunteer
complete explanations of their Bill in Parliament. And Parliament, in the special cir-
cumstances of that summer, did not look behind the explanations offered.
Id at 97-98.
27. See 919 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1878-81 (1976) (statement of the Sec-
retary of State for the Home Department, Mr. Merlyn Rees) [hereinafter Rees
Statements] (describing the criminal liability under Section two of the Official Se-
crets Act); Des Wilson, Information is Power: The Causes of Secrecy, in THE
SECRETS FILE: THE CASE FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN BRITAIN TODAY 13,
13-15 (Des Wilson ed., 1984) (describing section two). Compare id, with OSA
1989, supra note 10, § 1 ("A person who is or has been a member of the security
and intelligence services... is guilty of an offense if without lawful authority he
discloses any information, document or other article relating to security or intelli-
gence ... ."), and OSA 1989, supra note 10, § 2 ("[A] person who is or has been a
Crown Servant... is guilty of an offense if without lawful authority he makes a
damaging disclosure of any information, document or other article relating to de-
fense .... ).
28. See Wilson, supra note 27, at 15 ("Not only does it [Section 2] make it an
offence to disclose official information, but it also makes it an offence to receive
it.")
29. See id (clarifying the nature of an offense under the Official Secrets Act of
1911) Under the act, it had to be proved that the recipient knew at the time that he
received the information that the information was communicated to him or her "in
contravention of the Official Secrets Act." Id If this is shown, what was done with
the information subsequently is irrelevant. See id An individual who receives such
information can defend himself only by proving "that the information was com-
municated contrary to his or her desire." Id
30. See PONTING, supra note 1, at 1; 219 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 598
(1993) (statement of The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in 1993, Mr. Wil-
liam Waldegrave) [hereinafterWaldegrave Statement] (conceding that the govern-
ment "keep[s] too many secrets .... [W]e make secrets of matters that should not
be secret").
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the Official Secrets Act of 1911 was amended in 1989,31 it still stands
as a formidable barrier to the implementation of freedom of informa-
tion legislation by maintaining Britain's traditional secretive culture
and a norm of non-disclosure of information.32
2. Ministerial Accountability
Comprehending the principle of Ministerial Accountability is
germane to understanding Britain's closed government."3 This con-
31. See OSA 1989, supra note 10. See generally Patrick Birkinshaw, Access,
Disclosure and Regulation, 140 NEw L.J. 1637 (1990) (describing the changes in
provisions in the OSA that took place pursuant to the 1989 amendments, including
the extensive 1920 amendments). In general, the 1989 legislation ends the broad
criminalization of the "disclosure of 'official information without authority."' Id.
The OSA limits the application of the criminal law to the "unauthorized 'damag-
ing' disclosures in six areas of protected information[:] security and intelligence;
defense; prevention of crime; information obtained under security or interception
warrants; information relating to international relationships; and that received from
overseas Governments in confidence." Id.
32. See Birkinshaw, supra note 31, at 1637 (stating that although the legisla-
tion appears liberalising[,] ... certain disclosures are automatically presumed
damaging"); 219 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 641 (1993) (statement of Mr. Tony
Wright) [hereinafter Wright Statement] (undercutting the reforms of the OSA
which were eighty years in the making, while stating "the new legislation not only
continued to allow ample scope for continued prosecutions ... but was emphati-
cally not intended to form part of a widening of access to official information").
But see infra notes 277-78 and accompanying text (setting forth the argument
against a radical change of the OSA).
33. See LEIGH, supra note 21, at 19 ("Ministerial responsibility is stone dead
as a justification for bureaucratic secrecy, but it is a pity it will not lie down.");
Des Wilson, The Struggle to Overcome Secrecy in Britain, in THE SECRETS FILE:
THE CASE FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN BRITAIN TODAY 125, 134-35 (Des
Wilson, ed. 1984) (providing a copy of a letter written by Prime Minister Thatcher
to the 1984 Campaign for Freedom of Information stating that Parliament is the
reason why Britain does not need freedom of information legislation). The Prime
Minister's letter states:
Under our constitution, Ministers are accountable to Parliament for the work of their
departments, and that includes the provision of information. A statutory right of public
access would remove this enormously important area of decision-making from Minis-
ters and parliament and transfer ultimate decision to the courts. No matter how care-
fully the rights were defined and circumscribed, that would be the essential constitu-
tional result. The issues requiring interpretation would tend to be political rather than
judicial, and the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature could be greatly
damaged. But above all, Ministers' accountability to parliament would be reduced, and
parliament itself diminished .... In our view the right place for Ministers to answer
for their decisions in the essentially 'political' area of information is in parliament.
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stitutional doctrine makes ministers, not civil servants, accountable
to Parliament for their departments' policies and actions.' In effect,
this doctrine makes ministers responsible for all decisions as to what
information can be released to Parliament.3 As such, the minister is
34. See GRANT JORDAN, THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 210 (1994)
("The basic idea of individual ministerial accountability is that it is a means of en-
suring parliamentary control over individual ministers and departments."). In
elaborating on this principle, Jordan notes that individual Ministers are account-
able for not only their own actions and decisions, but also for those of civil ser-
vants under their authority. See id; see also COLIN CAMPBELL & GRAHAM K.
WILSON, THE END OF WHITEHALL: DEATH OF A PARADIGM? 11 (1995) (asserting
that ministers are the "only legitimate representatives of their departments in pub-
ie... [O]nly ministers could answer to Parliament... Civil servants were neither
seen nor heard in public. . . "). Campbell and Wilson also compare the principle of
individual ministerial responsibility to the principle of collective responsibility,
which is generally represented as one of the major doctrines under the British con-
stitution. See id at 10-13. Collective responsibility is based upon the idea of col-
lective decision making; that is, all ministers are responsible collectively for the
government's policy. See id at 12. For example, it is a requirement that the Min-
ister of Agriculture be prepared to vote in the House of Commons or speak in the
country in favor of the government's defense policy. See id See generally Geof-
frey Marshall, Introduction to MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBMY 1, 1-11 (Geoffrey
Marshall ed. 1989) (describing the doctrines of ministerial responsibility, the
"most general principle of parliamentary government, and collective responsibil-
ity, "one of the major conventions of the constitution"). But see DAVID JUDGE,
THE PARLIAMENTARY STATE 136-146 (1993) (characterizing individual ministerial
responsibility as "an erroneous doctrine" and collective responsibility as "old
wine in old bottles"); JORDAN, supra at 218 (discussing the "incompatibility" of
collective and ministerial responsibility in that the delinquent Minister is able to
"escape individual ministerial responsibility by sheltering under the probability
that the House cannot selectively punish him"); TREVOR SMITH & ALISON YOUNG,
THE FIXERS: CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN BRITISH POLmcs 3 (1996) (lambasting the
concept of ministerial responsibility and describing it as "now accepted as almost
totally inoperative"); cf POLITICS UK 430 (Jones et al., 1991) [hereinafter
PoLmcs] (delineating the modem role of ministerial responsibility in the UK;
whereby, ministers have to answer for their own conduct but are not deemed to be
held responsible for that of their officials "unless this was in the name and cogni-
zance of the minister").
35. See PONTING supra note 1, at 44-45 ("[A]lthough in this era of vastly ex-
panded departmental responsibilities it is no longer feasible for a minister to exer-
cise.., control over.., his civil servants, he can still control the flow of informa-
tion provided to MPs through answers to parliamentary questions and the evidence
presented to select Committees."). The Prime Minister must stand before Parlia-
ment bi-weekly and answer questions. See id The procedure differs, however, for
individual departments. See Harold Wilson, Prime Minister Answerability, in
MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY 95, 96 (Geoffrey Marshall ed., 1989). Most depart-
mental ministers face questions only every three, four, or five weeks, and they can
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able to control the flow of information pertaining to his department.36
Moreover, under this doctrine, this information may never be placed
in the public domain because media access to civil servants is re-
stricted.37 A freedom of information act will curtail a minister's abil-
ity to control the flow of information. Such a measure will make the
minister more accountable to the public, as well as to Parliament, be-
cause the minister's activities will be open to wider scrutiny. In order
for Blair to succeed in capturing Parliament's and his Cabinet's sup-
port, he must introduce a freedom of information bill that is in har-
mony with this principle. Particularly, he must focus on the greater
accountability that will ensue under such legislation even if ultimate
review rests with the courts.3"
3. Crown Privilege
Another British tradition that aids in maintaining the culture of se-
crecy is the custom of using "public-interest certificates" under the
doctrine of crown privilege.39 "Crown privilege means that courts
have no authority to disclose the workings of government if a minis-
divide the questions for answering among the members of the whole departmental
team. See id.; see also POLITICS, supra note 34, at 336 (detailing Question Time).
Ministers who oppose Freedom of Information legislation assert that Parliamentary
Question Time provides sufficient openness and flow of information. See id. They
characterize Question Time which occurs every day from Monday through Thurs-
day for fifty-five minutes as an act of "scrutinizing government." See id. But see
P.ONTING, supra note 1, at 45 (criticizing the ineffectiveness of Question Time).
36. See PONTING, supra note 1, at 45 (indicating that Ministers habitually reply
to Parliamentary Questions with only a minimum of information and may decline
to answer on the grounds that information is not readily available).
37. See CAMPBELL & WILSON supra note 34, at 11 (noting that journalists and
academic researchers have been denied access to civil servants because of the
doctrine of individual ministerial accountability).
38. See Wilson, supra note 33, at 134 (discussing Margaret Thatcher's strongly
held views that any interference by the judiciary will damage the principle of min-
isterial responsibility).
39. See LEIGH, supra note 21, at 43 (stating in regard to informational control
that "the final loophole stopped up by Whitehall is in the courts"). Specifically,
Leigh explains that until 1968, a ministerial certificate was enough to prevent gov-
ernment documents from being disclosed in the courts. See id See generally A.P.
TANT, BRITISH GOvERNMENT: THE TRIUMPH OF ELITISM 25-27 (1993) (contrasting
the role of British courts in bringing about Freedom of information legislation and
going against the government with the roles of United States and Swedish courts in
this area).
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ter considers such disclosure to be against the public interest."" Un-
der this doctrine, many categories of documents, including Cabinet
minutes and diplomatic exchanges are barred from the courts.4
Judges, in the past, did not draw on their official power to compel
disclosure of documents or review ministers' reasons as to why the
withholding of the documents is in the public interest. The implica-
tions of these withholdings are severe since British judges and juries
are only required to review and evaluate the evidence placed before
them.42 Although the courts of England have narrowed the scope and
application of this privilege since the 1970s by reviewing ministers'
reasons for claiming such certificates,43 the government continues to
40. See TANT, supra note 39, at 25 (defining Crown Privilege); E.R HARDY
IvAMY, MOZLEY & WHITELEY'S LAW DICTIONARY 216 (11 th ed. 1993) (defining
public interest immunity as "[t]he right of the Crown to withhold the disclosure
and production of a document on the ground that its disclosure and production
would be injurious to the public interest"). The Crown can decide either to waive
or to claim such a right; however, the person to whom the document relates has no
power to assert a claim. See id Only the minister of the government department
who seeks the certificate can claim that it should be withheld and/or disclosed on
the basis of public interest. See id The court can then either accept or deny the
claim based on its discretion. See id
41. See LEIGH supra note 21, at 44 (detailing the types of information that
Ministers withheld under the doctrine including cabinet minutes, diplomatic ex-
changes, etc., and highlighting the extreme withholdings, such as an army doctor
who was not allowed to testify on a report about a soldier's condition). The British
crown privilege was picked up in the United States as a justification for the gov-
ernmental "Executive Privilege" or the official information privilege now known
as the "deliberative process privilege." See generally 26 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHr
& KENNETH A. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 5663 (1992)
(documenting the history of governmental privileges in the United States). Both
the "executive privilege" and "deliberative process privilege" concern govern-
mental information, the disclosure of which would chill the candor in policy mak-
ing. See infra notes 415-17 and accompanying text (describing Exemption five of
the United States' Freedom of Information Act which protects certain inter and in-
tra agency documents pursuant to the deliberative process privilege).
42. See PONTING supra note 1, at 50 (emphasizing that official secrecy affects
the process of civil law in Britain, particularly under the doctrine of Crown Privi-
lege because the jury has no responsibility for ensuring that the evidence is com-
plete).
43. See TANT, supra note 39, at 26 (describing the narrowing of the scope of
Crown Privilege in the principle case of Conwc, v. Rimmer). Duncan v. Cammell
Laird, 1 All E.R. 587 (H.L. 1939), established two public interest tests under Brit-
ish law: with regard to the content or with regard to the class of document. See id
The court held that the minister's decision was final where a signed affidavit held
that the public interest was served by withholding a document falling into either of
these categories. See id In 1968, however, the House of Lords "revolutionized the
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assert this privilege as a justification for withholding information,
even when the disclosure of the information would be in the public
interest."
A freedom of information act would require ministers to disclose
certain information and provide a more extensive mandatory system
of review.45 Ultimately, if Blair chooses the courts as the final review
mechanism, the judicial system's power over the government will in-
crease.6 Accordingly, the British government fights freedom of in-
formation statutes and latches on to the traditional Crown Privilege,
Official Secrets Act, and Ministerial Accountability as means of re-
taining control over its information and power. 7 The next section ex-
amines several scandals which have exposed the government's use of
these three mechanisms to maintain its power through governmental
secrecy.
B. RECENT SCANDALS EXPOSING BRITAIN'S SECRET CULTURE
Four main scandals have surfaced in the courts since the early
1980s that have revealed Britain's secretive culture.48 These events
law on Crown Privilege" in Conway v. Rimmer, 1968 P.910 (Eng. C.A.). See T.
MURRAY RANKIN, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN CANADA: WILL THE DOORS STAY
SHUT? 19 (1977) (explaining how the Canadian judiciary continues to regard Eng-
lish Crown Privilege decisions as very persuasive, if not binding authority, citing
celebrated English Crown Privilege cases). Specifically, Conway introduced two
new principles: "first that courts did have the right to inspect documents for which
Crown Privilege was being claimed, and secondly, that claims of Crown Privilege
based upon the class of a document were more likely to be questioned." Id.; see
also infra Part I.B.4 (discussing how five ministers signed public interest certifi-
cates under the doctrine of Crown Privilege preventing three British executives
from proving their innocence in court in the Matrix Churchill affair).
44. See infra Part I.B.4 (describing the Matrix Churchill case).
45. Cf BIRKINSHAW, supra note 9, at 138 (noting that the Local Government
(Access to Information) Act of 1985 provides for access to local authorities' in-
formation).
46. See id. at 24 (suggesting that taking away the government's power to pre-
serve information could establish new centers of power).
47. See infra Part II (detailing the strong ministerial reaction against several
attempts to introduce freedom of information legislation).
48. Although the four scandals included in the text illustrate the excessive level
of secrecy in Britain and the need for freedom of information legislation, another
interesting court case and an incident that received public attention are Regina v.
Secretary of State for Defense, ex parte Sancto and the "apple juice incident." See
Roy Edey, Minister's Outrageous Decision Not Unlawful, 142 NEW L.J. 1748
(1992) (detailing the "absurdity" of the Sancto case); Adam Sage, The Juice of
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are important because they have stimulated intense criticism over
such secrecy, making it more likely that Prime Minister Blair's pro-
posal for a freedom of information statute will reach fruition.
1. The Sarah Tisdall Case
Sarah Tisdall,49 a 23 year old civil servant, working in the office of
the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth affairs, plead
guilty to communicating classified information in violation of Sec-
tion two of the Official Secrets Act of 1911 .° Tisdall sent photocop-
ies of two "confidentially" marked documents pertaining to the arri-
val of cruise missiles in Britain to the local newspaper." Affirming
Tisdall's sentence of six months imprisonment, the appellate court
held that such a sentence was unavoidable because "an element of
deterrence was required."52 Although Tisdall agreed to be prosecuted
This Apple is a British Secret, INDEP., Feb. 14, 1993, at 3 (revealing how the Min-
istry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food kept secret their knowledge that "high
levels of a carcinogenic chemical, patulin, had been found in some brands of apple
juice" and stating that "In Britain, there is no Freedom of Information Act and no
way of forcing the Government to disclose such details"). In Sancto, the Secretary
of State denied Kirk Sancto's parents access to their dead son's Army Board of In-
quiry Report, which contained wrongful allegations that their son died due to be-
ing the "worse for drink." Edey, supra, at 1748. Sancto's parents have no remedy
because the "Minister can act as judge and jury in his own cause and protect the
Army from embarrassment without impunity," even when there is a pathologist's
report saying otherwise. See id
49. SeeR v. Tisdall, 6 Crim. App. 155 (Eng. C.A.).
50. See id; OSA 1911, supra note 23, at § 2; see also PoNTING, supra note 1,
at 63-64 (describing the trial); Wilson, supra note 33, at 146-47 (detailing the
case). See generally DAVID CAUTE, THE ESPIONAGE OF THE SAINTS at ix (1986)
(reporting on the punitive measures taken against a Zimbabwean writer, Dam-
budzo Marechera, and two British civil servants, Sarah Tisdall and Clive Ponting,
who in 1984, committed "word-crime").
51. See R. v. Tisdall, 6 Crim. App. at 155 (recounting how on Oct. 21, 1983
Tisdall "took the opportunity of a lull in the busy affairs to read the contents of
two minutes and she, having read them, decided to make an extra copy of each...
and take them to the Guardian newspaper). The Guardian Newspaper was subse-
quently brought to Court by the British Crown in Secretary of State for Defense
and another v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd., 3 All E.Rt 601 (H.L. 1984) in order to
compel the return of the documents. See 3 All E.R. 601 (H.L. 1984). At issue in
the case was whether the Crown was entitled to order disclosure and whether dis-
closure was necessary in interests of national security. See id The Court held that
the Guardian must disclose the document because "a potential threat to national
security was clearly revealed" but Lord Fraser dissented. Id
52. See Tisdall, 6 Crim. App. at 155 C'It is of course impossible to run any
concern, and certainly not possible to run a government department ... if confi-
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if she published any official information 3 when she signed the Offi-
cial Secrets Act Declaration Form prior to her employment, many
felt that her sentence was too severe. 4 Not only had national security
not been compromised by the release of these documents, but Tisdall
was not given the opportunity to make a defense on the grounds that
she was acting in the public interest." Furthermore, after her trial,
Tisdall criticized her superior's "deliberate attempt to avoid account-
ability in Parliament" for her wrongful actions. 6 Interestingly, the
Government used the Official Secrets Act to prosecute Tisdall, but it
ignored the principle of ministerial accountability because its use
would have caused further embarrassment and scandal among the
higher echelons of the British government."
2. The Clive Ponting Case
The second case to draw national attention to Britain's secretive
dential and secret memoranda are being divulged to outside bodies by members of
the staff. . . . [T]hose who deliberately break the law in this way will not be
treated with much sympathy .... ).
53. See id. (citing the Official Secrets Declaration Form) In pertinent part, the
form read: "I am aware that I should not divulge any information gained by me..
• [I] understand also that I am liable to be prosecuted if I publish without official
sanction any information ......
54. See PONTING, supra note 1, at 64 (stating that "the unexpected and dispro-
portionate severity of the sentence provoked almost universal condemnation");
WILSON, supra note 33, at 147 (providing the arguments asserted by the 1984
Campaign for Freedom of Information about the Tisdall case); CAUTE, supra note
50, at 124 (noting that the Leader of the Opposition denounced Tisdall's prison
sentence, MP's visited her in jail, and women demonstrated outside Holloway
Gaol where she was imprisoned).
55. See Tisdall, 6 Crim. App. at 155 (stating that the Court did not allow the
introduction of the argument that Tisdall was "incensed by political subterfuge"
and that she had not realized that it was common knowledge that these missiles
were due to be delivered from America); see also Wilson, supra note 33, at 147
(providing the Campaign for Freedom of Information's remarks about the Tisdall
case and its argument that Tisdall should have been provided a public interest de-
fense as it exists in the United States).
56. See PONTING, supra note 1, at 64 (describing how at trial Tisdall plead
guilty but afterwards defended her actions and "spoke of the immorality of the De-
fense Secretary's deliberate attempt to avoid accountability in Parliament").
57. See generally JORDAN, supra note 34, at 210 (characterizing ministerial re-
sponsibility and the expectation that a minister step down for the actions of a civil
servant as "fruitless" since, "this principle ... runs into the party political factor
that it would be politically embarrassing for the pro-Government majority party..
. to criticize its own leading members").
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culture, also for a breach of the Official Secrets Act of 1911, was the
Clive Ponting case. 8 Ponting, as head of a section of the Defense
Ministry, had the duty of preparing draft replies and answers on the
sinking of the Argentinean battle cruiser "General Belgrano." " Pon-
ting disagreed with his co-workers' interpretation of the event, and
furthermore, how they planned to report this information to Parlia-
ment.6" As a result, Ponting sent two documents to a member of Par-
liament who was trying to uncover the facts regarding the Belgrano.6"
He was subsequently prosecuted under Section two for communi-
cating official information to a person with whom he was not
authorized to share such information.62 At Ponting's trial, the first
full-scale public interest -defense was aired, 6' and Ponting was ac-
58. See Godfrey Hodgson, Why Section Two is Only the Tip of the Iceberg,
FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 16, 1985, at 25 ("The Ponting case was not only about
official secrecy. It was also about openness--or rather the lack of openness-in
British Government."); Official Cleared of Secrets Breach, FACTS ON FILE WORLD
NEWS DIGEST, Feb. 15, 1985, at 109 BI (indicating that "the case's outcome was
considered significant in the current debate over whether the secrets law should be
strengthened or liberalized").
59. See BIRKINSHAW, supra note 9, at 101-03 (detailing the Ponting case);
CAUTE, supra note 50, at 157 (providing a thorough discussion of the Ponting and
Belgrano affair with the main focus being on the fact that the decision to prosecute
Ponting was a political one). The General Belgrano, an Argentine battle cruiser,
was torpedoed by a British submarine during the Falklands War with Argentina,
and resulted in the death of 368 Argentine men. See id at 153-55 (detailing Brit-
ain's role in the sinking of the Belgrano); see also Harvey Morris, Secrets,
REUTERS, LTD., Feb. 17, 1985 (explaining why Ponting resigned).
60. See CAUTE, supra note 50, at 64 (illustrating the ways in which the Gov-
ernment was deceiving Parliament, for example, the different course and position
that the Belgrano was in before the torpedoing and the fact that the HMS Con-
queror had been shadowing the boat for thirty hours prior); see also Morris, supra
note 59 (quoting Ponting who said that "his argument and that of the opposition is
that the government deliberately misled parliament about the facts of the incident
in order to save itself political embarrassment rather than to safeguard national se-
curity").
61. See generally CAUTE, supra note 50, at 145-211 (detailing the drafts and
series of events that resulted in Ponting sending two documents to MP Tam Daly-
ell).
62. See BIRKINSHAW, supra note 9, at 101 (recounting how Ponting was prose-
cuted for breach of § 2(l)(a), which made it a crime to communicate official in-
formation to any person other than to whom is authorized to receive it, or "a per-
son to whom it is his duty in the interest of the state to communicate it").
(emphasis added). Whether or not it was in the interest of the state was a key issue
at trial. It resulted in Ponting's public interest defense.
63. See PONTING, supra note 1, at 64 (observing that "[t]he ten-day trial in
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quitted, even though the crucial rulings in law went against him.'
This trial was described by many as a "political prosecution brought
by an embarrassed government,"65 which marked the death for Sec-
tion two of the Official Secrets Act of 191 1.6 Courts refused to allow
the "catch-all," blanket prohibitions of Section two to ascertain
criminal liability. 67 Although this case highlights the increasingly ac-
tive role that British courts are taking to combat excessive secrecy by
allowing a public interest defense, it was ultimately the jury who de-
fied the law.68
A freedom of information act would further the courts' role in
checking the government. Additionally, such an act would allow both
the public and officials access to and freedom with information that
is in the public interest, like the information in the Ponting case.
3. The Peter Wright Case
Commonly referred to as the Spycatcher Affair, this third case il-
lustrating the government's desire to keep its activities secret, did not
even take place in Britain.69 Peter Wright, a former British Secret
February 1985 provided the first full-scale airing of a public interest defense");
Morris, supra note 59 (providing Ponting's justifications for disclosing the Bel-
grano information, particularly that the information stalled further questioning in
Parliament was the most "blatant" and misleading cover-up that he had come
across in his 14 years in the civil service).
64. See CAUTE, supra note 50, at 166, 173 (describing how part of the trial was
held in camera, the "best interest of the state" was interpreted as the best interest
of the government of the day, and lack of mens rea was not allowed as a defense).
65. PONTING, supra note 1, at 65.
66. See BIRKiNSHAW, supra note 9, at 103 (stating that Ponting's acquittal was
a death knell for Section two of the Official Secrets Act of 1911); The Ponting Ac-
quittal: Others May Still Be Caught in the Net, ECONOMIST, Feb. 16, 1985, at 29
(stating in regard to the OSA that "Mr. Ponting's acquittal has been hailed as its
death-knell"); UK: David Hopper and Christopher Capro Look at the Planned
Reform of the Official Secrets Act, BROADCAST, Oct. 28, 1988 [hereinafter Reform]
(advancing that "[t]he move to reform Section 2 arises because it has become un-
workable since the acquittal of Clive Ponting in 1985").
67. See infra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing the "catch-all"
quality of Section two).
68. See Moles' Lib, ECoNOMIsT, Feb. 16, 1985, at 13 (stating that
"[e]verybody loves an independent jury. .. the eight men and four women...
threw out the government's charges").
69. See PONTING supra note 1, at 65-66 (titling the excerpt in his book "the
Spycatcher Affair" and describing the trial in Australia). Although the main case
took place in Australia, the Thatcher Government brought suits in New Zealand,
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Service agent published his memoirs in Australia in an attempt to
avoid prosecution under the Official Secrets Act.7" Accordingly, the
British government brought suit in Australia seeking injunctions un-
der the law of confidentiality7 to prevent subsequent circulation of
this information. The Australian court held that it was not justified
in restraining media reports concerning unauthorized disclosures un-
less there was a risk of further damage to Britain's national secu-
rity.73 Since this risk had become moot, due to the passage of time
and the publication of the novel in the United States, the British gov-
ernment suffered a costly defeat.74 The trial helped expose the illegal
activities of Britain's Secret Service and "illustrated the govern-
ment's resistance in allowing the public interest and freedom of the
press to override the civil law of confidentiality." "
Hong Kong, and Britain to prevent the local papers from publishing Wright's alle-
gations and details of all of the trials. See id See generally THE SPYCATCHER
CASES (Michael Fysh ed., 1989) (providing all of the Spycatcher Court Judge-
ments that occurred in Australia, Britain, New Zealand, and Hong Kong).
70. See BIRKINSHAW supra note 9, at 103 (stating that "Wright sought to pub-
lish his memoirs in Australia-outside the criminal jurisdiction of [Section] 2").
71. See ALISON COLEMAN, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS 4
(1992) (detailing that in English law, three conditions must be satisfied for a civil
action for breach of confidence: first, the information must be confidential, second,
the information must have been disclosed in circumstances which give rise to an
obligation of confidence, and third, there must be an actual or anticipated unau-
thorized use or disclosure of the information); Nicholas Rose, Whistleblowing-
Time for a Change?, 145 NEW L.J. 6680 (1995) ("All civil servants owe the
Crown, as their employer, a duty of confidentiality .... Whether or not the
criminal law applies they must protect official information which is held in
confidence because it has been communicated in confidence ... ."). In response to
the claim that Wright owed a duty to the Crown, his attorney argued that the
government's case was an attempt to enforce the OSA in Australia, a separate
sovereign entity, in contravention of the recognized principle of international law
that "the courts of one country will not enforce the penal or public laws of
another." MALCOLM TURNBULL, THE SPYCATCHER TRIAL: THE SCANDAL
BEHIND THE #1 BEST SELLER 38 (1989).
72. See Attorney General v. Heinemann Publishers, Australia Pty. Ltd. and
Wright (1987) N.S.W.S. Ct. Cas., reprinted in TURNBULL, supra note 71, at 352-
53 (explaining that because there was no contract between the parties, the British
Attorney General could only succeed by establishing that the disclosure of infor-
mation would be detrimental to the public interest of the United Kingdom).
73. See id (harmonizing the risk of national security with the public interest).
74. See The Wright Case: Wrong Decision 137 NEW L.J. 723 (expressing the
absurdity of protecting information that has already been released in the United
States). Spycatcher had been published in the United States and Canada prior to its
release in Australia. See id
75. See BRKINSHAW supra note 9, at 103-04 (construing the Spycatcher as a
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Although the British government suffered a defeat in this instance,
the government might have prevailed in certain British courts. Had a
freedom of information act been in place, the expensive trial could
have been prevented since most of the information that Wright dis-
closed would have initially been deemed disclosable in the public
interest.
4. The Matrix Churchill Case
Three company executives from the machine tools firm, Matrix
Churchill, were prosecuted for the illegal export of arms to Iraq in
violation of Export of Goods Control Orders.76 The executives plead
not guilty on the basis that the government was fully aware of these
exports and was turning a blind eye to such exportation." The ex-
ecutives made requests for internal memoranda which would prove
their innocence; however, five ministers had signed public interest
certificates to suppress the release of this information and the gov-
ernment's knowledge of the exportation.7" Thus, these defendants
were almost imprisoned because certain ministers thought that the
good example of the government's attempts to remain secret); see also Reform,
supra note 66 (noting that "[f]ollowing the Spycatcher ruling, any intelligence of-
ficer seeking to emulate Wright would be held to be subject to a lifelong duty of
confidentiality and could not publish his allegations without the consent of Gov-
ernment").
76. See PYPER supra note 18, at 161 (citing IAN LEIGH, MATRIX-CHURCHILL,
SUPERGUN AND THE ScoTr INQUIRY (1993)).
77. See Richard Norton-Taylor, The Scott Report: Punches are Pulled Over
Blame But Ministers Feel Body Blow, GUARDIAN, Feb. 16, 1996, at 12 (stating that
three ministers secretly relaxed export controls to Iraq at the end of 1988 after the
cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war and failed to be forthcoming with this policy); cf R
v. Blackledge and Ors, 326 Crim. App. (1995) (using the documents and informa-
tion discovered in the Matrix Churchill case, the defendants plead "not guilty" for
the same reason and the court of appeals reversed the lower court's decision hold-
ing that the documents should have been made available to the defense before the
trial to demonstrate their innocence).
78. See PYPER, supra note 18, at 161 (emphasizing the government's knowl-
edge); Sally Weale, The Scott Report: Sir Nicholas Lyell Should Have Told Prose-
cution of Heseltine's Reservations, GUARDIAN, Feb. 16, 1996, at 15 (reporting on
the criticism that Sir Nicholas, the Attorney General, received for preparing the
Public Interest Immunity (PII) certificates which were more commonly known as
"gag orders"). "The PIls prevented disclosure to the court of documents which
would have shown that guidelines on exports to Iraq had changed and thus that the
Matrix Churchill directors were not in breach of government guidelines." Id.
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withholding of this information was in the public interest.79
As illustrated in these four cases, the British Government goes to
great lengths to conceal its inner-workings. Although the Official Se-
crets Act has lost some of its authority, as evidenced by the Ponting
trial, the Act still makes it an offense to disclose or receive certain
governmental information." It is important to note that the Tisdall,
Ponting, and Wright cases all focus on civil servants-not on the
general public. In terms of the general public's comprehensive right
of access to government information, little has changed.8" These
cases are important to the freedom of information campaign because
they have prompted the public to distrust the government and to re-
quest statutory rights of access to information.' Britons fear more
scandals. Hence, a freedom of information act is necessary to expose
scandals and serve as a check on government officials so that scan-
dals are less likely to occur in the first place. 3 Parliamentary debates
as to why a freedom of information act is necessary in Britain further
highlight this argumente and the Matrix Churchill case in particu-
lar."5 The next section examines some of these debates.
79. See Maurice Frankel, Implications of Government Secrecy Over Decisions
on Exports to Iraq, TM1ES (London), Nov. 23, 1992, (Features) (charging that
"[t]he implication is that ministers used their control of official information to
protect themselves from embarrassment, regardless of the cost to the defendants");
Geoffrey Robertson, Misleading By Example, OBSERVER, May 25, 1997, at 18
(book review) (summarizing Scott's report and pointing out that "[t]he Matrix
Churchill scandal occurred because Ministers and mandarins and lawyers em-
ployed by the Government chose to protect the State at the expense of their duty to
justice"). According to Robertson, Scott's most important recommendation "is the
urgent need for a freedom of information act." Id "His report provides ample evi-
dence that the decisions that were made about arming Saddam would have been
better decisions had such legislation been in force." Id
80. See supra notes 27, 31-32 (detailing the criminal liability under the Official
Secrets Act, as amended in 1989).
81. See supra notes 11 & 14 (providing the Labour Government's promise to
finally bring a freedom of information statute to Britain).
82. See New Labour, supra note 11.
83. See Timmins, supra note 14, at 10 (advocating the introduction of a free-
dom of information act).
84. 219 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th Ser.) (1992-93).
85. See Frankel, supra note 79, (Features).
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II. PRIOR ATTEMPTS AT CURTAILING THE
SECRECY AND IMPLEMENTING FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION LEGISLATION
Despite the scandals, Britain remains without a freedom of infor-
mation act.86 Over the years, however, the government has become
more open.87 Many argue that this increased openness, non-statutory
rights of access,88 and voluntary disclosure of official information,
however, are not enough.89 Before examining the access statutes of
other countries and making recommendations as to the form of the
United Kingdom's freedom of information act, it is necessary to ex-
amine prior acts,9" initiatives,9' and arguments9" brought before Par-
liament.
86. See discussion supra Part I.B (detailing the Sarah Tisdall case, the Clive
Ponting case, the Peter Wright case, and the Matrix Churchill case all of which ex-
pose Britain's secret culture).
87. See infra notes 269-76 and accompanying text (discussing five recently en-
acted statutes that British MPs point to as evidence of the government's increasing
openness).
88. See discussion infra Part II.C.2 (explaining the non-statutory Code of
Practice on Access to Official Information which currently controls information
disclosure in Britain, on the national level).
89. See Clwyd, supra note 14 (quoting Tony Blair at the 1996 Campaign for
Freedom of Information Awards Night). Blair said:
A Freedom of Information Act would signal a culture change that would make a dra-
matic difference to the way that Britain is governed... It is part of bringing our poli-
tics up to date, of letting politics catch up with the aspirations of people and delivering
not just more open, but more effective and efficient government for the future.
Id. (emphasis added).
90. See discussion infra Part II.B.2(discussing the Local Government (Access
to Information) Act).
91. See discussion infra Parts II.A.I., II.C.2 (discussing Labour Prime Minister
Harold Wilson's inquiry into governmental secrecy, the Croham Directive, and
Conservative Prime Minister John Major's White Paper on open government).
92. See discussion infra Parts II.A., IIB., IIC (providing MPs arguments in fa-
vor of and in opposition to freedom of information legislation).
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A. 1970-198093
1. Wilson and Croham
Just prior to the 1970s, the Committee of the Civil Service, led by
Lord Fulton, presented a report to Labour Prime Minister Harold
Wilson.94 The report argued that the government was excessively se-
cret and that a full inquiry to put an end to this secrecy was neces-
sary." As a result of this report, Wilson conducted an inquiry and
produced a White Paper entitled "Information and the Public Inter-
est." 96 Many freedom of information advocates assert that Wilson's
inquiry was incomplete and unsatisfactory because it was conducted
without consulting other governmental departments and his delibera-
tions were confidential.97 Critics were also unhappy with the sub-
stance of the White Paper. The Paper reported that the government
was already releasing more information to the public and that the Of-
ficial Secrets Act was no barrier to greater openness. 98
Two years later the Conservatives came to power pledging in their
manifesto to curb secrecy and reform the Official Secrets Act.9 An-
93. A chronological breakdown was chosen by the author as a means of evalu-
ating the changes concerning access-or lack of it--to information in Britain, in
the simplest way possible. This structure will allow the reader to easily match up
the time periods with the government of the day.
94. See Wilson, supra note 33, at 124-25 (providing a thorough discussion of
the Fulton Report).
95. See id. at 125. The Fulton report stated:
The increasingly wide range of problems handled by the government, and their far
reaching effects upon the community as a whole, demand the widest possible consul-
tation with its different parts and interests... It is healthy for a democracy increas-
ingly to press to be consulted and informed. There are still too many occasions when
information is unnecessarily withheld and consultation merely perfunctory... It is an
abuse of consultation when it is turned into a belated attempt to prepare the ground for
decisions that in reality have been taken already.
Id (omissions in original).
96. PONTING, supra note 1, at 68.
97. See id (stating, "[t]he Wilson Government's response was an internal in-
quiry with no outside consultation"); see also Wilson, supra note 33, at 125 (un-
dercutting Wilson's inquiry into government secrecy because it was, somewhat
ironically, "an internal inquiry, and its deliberations had been confidential").
98. See Wilson, supra note 33, at 125 (outlining the White Paper's conclusion
that the OSA was no barrier because it "did not inhibit the 'authorised' release of
information in any way").
99. See generally The Conservative Party General Election Manifesto for
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other report, this time produced by Lord Frank and his committee,
recommended that Section one of the Official Secrets Act be trans-
formed into its own espionage act and Section two be "repealed and
replaced by narrower and specific provisions"1 00 due to its "catch all
quality." 10' Specifically, the Frank Committee proposed an Official
Information Act.'02 The Conservative government agreed with these
recommendations but claimed that it needed more time to consider
proposals and define the categories of protected information.'0 3
Parliamentary debates in 1978 reflected the government's slow
approach to implementing the Frank Committee's proposals."°4 Dur-
1970, reprinted in THE TIMES GUIDE TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS JUNE 1970
(1970) (calling for less government secrecy).
100. Wilson, supra note 32, at 126 (quoting the Frank Committee's Report); see
also 951 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1264 (1978) (statement of Mr. John) [herein-
after John Statements] (reiterating that the government accepts the general thrust
of the Frank Committee's argument that the section needs to be repealed and re-
placed by a narrower and more specific provision).
101. Havers Statements, supra note 23, at 1257-58 (quoting the Frank Commit-
tee's Report). The report reads as follows:
The main offence which section 2 creates is the unauthorized communication of offi-
cial information (including documents) by a Crown servant, The leading characteristic
of this offence is its catch-all quality. It catches all official documents and information.
It makes no distinction of kind, and no distinction of degree. All information which a
Crown learns in the course of his duty is "official" for the purposes of section 2,
whatever its nature, whatever its importance, whatever its original source. A blanket is
thrown over everything; nothings escapes. The section catches all Crown servants as
well as official information. Again, it makes no distinctions according to the nature or
importance of a Crown servant's duties. All are covered. Every Minister of the Crown,
every civil servant, every member of the Armed Forces, every police officer, performs
his duties subject to Section 2.
Id.
102. See Wilson, supra note 33, at 126 (stating that the Franks Committee "pro-
posed an Official Information Act making it an offence to disclose without
authorization a more narrowly defined range of information"); cf Rees State-
ments, supra note 27, at 1879 (voicing the government's conclusion that Section
two of the OSA should be replaced by an Official Information Act encompassing
the broad recommendations made by the Franks Committee).
103. See Wilson, supra note 33, at 126 (stating that the Heath government
agreed); PONTING supra note 1, at 68 (stating that government cited the need to
consider proposals as a reason for its delay in the production of a bill). The Franks
Committee proposed that six categories of information should be protected. See id.
See, e.g., John Statements, supra note 100, at 1265 (detailing the proposed catego-
ries that should be protected as: "defence or internal security; foreign relations; the
currency or the reserves; law and order; Cabinet documents; and information en-
trusted in confidence to the Government by a private individual or concern.")
104. See 951 PARE. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1312 (1978) (statement of Mr.
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ing a Parliamentary session in June of that year, MPs °5 debated the
general implementation of any freedom of information bill in the
United Kingdom, while examining reforms of Section two of the Of-
ficial Secrets Act.106 Most MPs referred to the freedom of informa-
tion Acts of the United States and Sweden when determining if such
an act could be implemented in the United Kingdom.0 7 Generally,
MPs opposed to the implementation of this bill argued that the con-
stitutional frameworks of the United States, Sweden, and the United
Gardner) [hereinafter Gardner Statements] (complaining that that the government
has "done virtually nothing" and that "ministers have been talking in their sleep"
in regard to the recommendations of the Frank Committee).
105. MP stands for Member of Parliament. This term incorporates both Minis-
ters and Private Members of the House of Commons. For the purposes of this pa-
per, whenever a Minister is cited to, his or her title will be included in order to dif-
ferentiate between the government and private members of Parliament.
106. See generally 951 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1256-58 (1978) (debating
how to narrow the provisions of the OSA so that criminal liability is limited to dis-
closure of specific confidential, official, and damaging information). Most MPs
during this June 15th debate and a debate held one month later on July 19th re-
garding the OSA took the view that reform of Section 2 was a precursor to the im-
plementation of a freedom of information act. See John Statements, supra note
100, at 1313 (suggesting that the modernization of Section 2 is an essential precur-
sor to a freedom of information bill); Rees Statements, supra note 27, at 542
(voicing that" [r]eform of section 2 necessarily comes first").
107. See Havers Statements, supra note 23, at 1259 (referring to the Freedom of
Information Acts of the United States and Sweden and noting their deficiencies).
See 951 PARt. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1276 (1978) (statement of Mr. Arthur Lewis)
[hereinafter Lewis Statements] (welcoming the introduction of freedom of infor-
mation legislation based on the United States and Sweden's models); 951 PARL.
DEB., H.C. (5th ser) 1280 (1978) (statement of Mr. Emyln Hooson) [hereinafter
Hooson Statements] (focusing on the United States FOIA in his rebuttal of Mr.
Brittan's views on the benefits of that act); cf 951 PARE. DEB., H.C.(5th ser.) 1289
(1978) (statement of Mr. Eric S. Heifer) [hereinafter Heifer Statements] (opining
that Britain need not follow the freedom of information legislation in the United
States and Sweden, but "should seek to lay down freedom of information legisla-
tion whose provisions are particular to this country"). Mr. Heifer, continued his
speech, speaking on behalf of the Labour party and defending their commitment to
freedom of information legislation. The text of his speech is as follows:
The fact is that a committee of the Labour Party is on the point of publishing a free-
dom of information Bill-legislation on which we have worked at considerable length
and which in our view is applicable to British conditions. That is a clear indication
that, so far as is humanly possible within certain limits, we want the most open gov-
ernment that we can get. One recognises that there are limits because, for example, one
cannot allow total freedom of information on defense, security or foreign diplomatic
relations. However, no doubt we could go much further on the subject of foreign dip-
lomatic relations than we do now ....
Id at 1290.
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Kingdom are dissimilar; thus, the United States and Swedish statutes
would not work in the United Kingdom,"0 8 due to excessive costs, 0 9
administrative burden,10 and the use of the legislation for business
espionage."' At the conclusion of these 1978 debates, Parliament ta-
108. See Havers Statement, supra note 23, at 1259 (warning the House of
Commons that it must remember that both the United States and Sweden have
written constitutions "so that judicial intervention in establishing the rights of the
citizen is much greater in the United Kingdom"). In addition, Havers noted that
"[a]ny discussion of freedom of information must be in the context of the estab-
lishment of a system of administrative courts." Id;. See also John Statements, su-
pra note 100, at 1266 (stating that the government is not hostile to the view of
freedom of information legislation, but that it must be aware of "other countries
with dissimilar constitutional arrangements... to see exactly how such a Bill...
would fit into [Britain's] constitutional pattern").
109. See 951 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1274 (1978) (statement of Mr. Brittan)
[hereinafter Brittan Statements] (expressing his grave doubts about the desirability
of a Freedom of Information Act like that of the United States because of its for-
midable costs, which he cites as 22 million dollars a year, and $146.67 per re-
quest). But see Hooson Statements, supra note 107, at 1281 (commenting that the
22 million dollar cost of the United States FOIA represents one-tenth of the origi-
nal anticipated cost).
110. See, e.g., Brittan Statements, supra note 109, at 1274 (describing how in
the United States, the FBI assigned 400 agents to review 10 million pages of
documents, and the United States Food and Drug Administration increased its staff
from seven to 40 as a result of the passage of FOIA).
111. See id. at 1274 (criticizing the use of the United States FOIA by businesses
for purposes amounting to "industrial espionage"). This MP's overall criticism
was that the United States Act was not being used by its citizens for the purposes
for which it was introduced. See id. Citizens were not using the FOIA to scrutinize
government operations nor engage in a dialogue about reform. See id. Fear that
this is how the FOLA would be used by Britons and the fact that once the United
States passed the FOIA it had to pass the Privacy Act (access to person's files) and
Sunshine Act (requiring Government agency meetings to be open to the public) led
MP Brittan to change his views on the benefits of freedom of information legisla-
tion in the UK. Id. at 1275. But see 951 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1258-1319
(1978) (describing the benefits of freedom of information legislation highlighted
by various NPs). One NP argued that freedom of information legislation would
provide certainty that information was not being deliberately fed to ministers. See
Lewis Statements, supra note 107, at 1276 (noting that if the government had an
official information act it would not have the daily errors and misleading informa-
tion it receives from the Treasury and it would be able to ascertain whether infor-
mation was being deliberately fed into the hands of ministers). In addition, Mr.
Lewis argued that members of parliament and the electorate "ought to have the
right to know" what the salary is of a chairman ofa board. Id. at 1277. Mr. Lewis
bases the electorate's right to know on the fact that each taxpayer pays the salary
of the ministers and civil servants. See id. Another MP, Mr. Gardner, argued that
freedom of information legislation would protect individuals against the misuse of
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bled the enactment of freedom of information legislation.' ,
2
The Labour Government that followed the Conservative Govern-
ment did even less to advance freedom of information."' The year
ended, however, with a crucial directive entitled the Croham Direc-
tive.114 This directive, which itself was confidential and leaked to the
press,"' directed ministers to make background material, both factual
power and position within a democracy. See Gardner Statements, supra note 104,
at 1310-11 (detailing the positive effects such legislation will have). Furthermore,
yet another MP stressed the positive change such legislation causes in the relation-
ship between the government and the community. See 951 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th
ser.) 1297 (1978) (statement of Miss Jo Richardson) (implying that the need for a
positive change in the relationship between the government and the governed,
which would be fostered by freedom of information, is the reason why the House
of Commons is having these debates). Another MP highlighted the amount the
government pays now for the release of its information. See Hooson Statements,
supra note 107, at 1282 (faulting other members for not considering the positive
effects of the United States act and harmonizing the amount the United States pays
for its FOIA to that which the United Kingdom allots for its federal information
budget). Mr. Hooson's statement was as follows:
When one compares the cost of the Freedom of Information Act of 20 million dollars
with, for example, the federal information budget- which gives the kind of informa-
tion which the government wants fed out, as opposed to information that they do
not- one can see that it is absolute chicken feed.
Id
112. See Rees Statements, supra note 27, at 539 (explaining how the govern-
ment does not yet have enough information to proceed in consideration of a free-
dom of information bill). One MP summed up a central issue concerning the de-
bate of freedom of information that the government must consider when he stated
that the proper public interest balance must be struck. See Havers Statement, supra
note 23, at 1258. Havers stated:
The area where secrecy and confidentiality should be protected must clearly be defined
and limited to the extent where it is generally acceptable and compatible with open
government A balance must be struck where the public interest is protected in both
ways. I mean by that that the public interest requires that matters of defense, interna-
tional security and Cabinet minutes... may need to be safeguarded against public dis-
closure. But the public interest also requires that there is no misuse of secrecy to cover
up errors or bungling to avoid criticism.
Id
113. See PONTiNG, supra note 1, at 68-71 (denouncing the method used by the
Callaghan government to release government policy studies because the govern-
ment retained discretion over what information was released and used the OSA to
bring criminal charges against the press when unreleased information was made
public).
114. See Wilson, supra note 33, at 128-29 (publishing most of the text of the
Croham Directive due to its importance to the freedom of information debate).
115. See PONTING, supra note 1, at 69.
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and analytical, available to the public.'1 6 Lord Croham, who initiated
the directive, stated that it was time that ministers made more infor-
mation available." 7 He also stated that those who longed for a free-
dom of information act would be disappointed by his directive since
it did not require ministers to release information."8 He chose the di-
rective over an act mainly because of the alleged high costs and ad-
ministrative burdens associated with such an act." 9
2. Freud's Official Information Bill
The new year began with the second reading of Liberal MP Clem-
ent Freud's private member, 2 ° "Official Information Bill.""'2 Since
Labour was in power, Freud began his speech to Parliament noting
that his bill was consistent with Labour's 1974 election manifesto
calling for more open government.' Freud's bill consisted of three
116. See Wilson, supra note 33, at 128-29 (directing Ministers to have a more
open attitude).
117. See id. (quoting Croham as arguing "it is intended to mark a real change of
policy"). But see Michael Hunt, Conclusion to OPEN GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF
THE PROSPECTS OF OPEN GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS OF THE BRITISH
POLITICAL SYSTEM 173, 178 (Richard A. Chapman & Michael Hunt eds., 1987)
(alluding to the decision of Prime Minister Thatcher in 1979 to rescind the most
active part of the Croham directive, putting an end to the experiment in open gov-
ernment).
118. See Wilson, supra note 33, at 129 ("[T]here are many who will have
wanted the government to go much further on the lines of the formidably burden-
some Freedom of Information Act in the USA.").
119. See id. (assessing Parliament's "prospects of being able to avoid such an
expensive development"). Compare id, with Brittan Statements, supra note 109, at
1274 (arguing that a freedom of information act would be very expensive in Brit-
ain) and infra Part III.B (detailing the fees and costs associated with the access
statutes of the United States, Canada, and Australia).
120. See generally DAVID MARSH & MELVYN READ, PRIVATE MEMBERS' BILLS
7-25 (providing a thorough discussion of the three types of Private Members'
bills). Bills are either introduced by the Government or through Private Members
of Parliament. See id. The Private Member's Bill procedure, however, "like
cricket, would baffle the intelligent alien" because it is done by ballot, and there
are only ten slots up for grabs. See id. at 7. Thus, it might take 30 years for a back-
bench member to introduce a private member bill. See id.
121. See 960 Parl. Deb, H.C. (5th Ser.) 2132 (1979) (statement of Mr. Clement
Freud) [hereinafter Freud Arguments] (initiating the debate regarding the Official
Information Bill).
122. See PONTING supra note 1, at 71 (describing how Clement Freud reminded
the House of Commons that his proposals were consistent with Labour's declared
policies for many years); Wilson supra note 33, at 129 (highlighting how Freud
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main parts: (1) establishing access to official information, (2) re-
pealing Section two of the Official Secrets Act, and (3) proposing
legislation to replace the security and confidentiality of the Official
Secrets Act." Ideologically, Freud sought a total change of the gov-
ernment's attitude by advocating that "everything shall be open." 4
Conceiving that civil servants would place one sentence contain-
ing information deemed exempt in a document to prevent the entire
document from being disclosed, Freud included a provision mandat-
ing that only the exempt portions of that document be withheld."n
Freud also included a provision calling for regular inspection of de-
partments' information procedures, which prompted considerable
discussion.16 Most MPs advocated for a Parliamentary Ombudsman
began his speech reminding the House, and in particular Labour Ministers that
what he proposed was consistent with Labour's policies over the years); see also
Freud Arguments, supra note 121, at 2132 (tracing the Labour Party's commit-
ment to openness in the 1974 party manifesto and 1977 and 1978 Queen's
Speeches).
123. See Freud Arguments, supra note 121, at 2132 (ranking the three parts of
his bill as stated in the text in order of importance). Specifically, Freud's bill con-
tained twenty-three clauses. See id at 2141. Clause one was designed to repeal the
Official Secrets Act, while clause two sought to establish a general right of access
to government documents. See id Freud also defines an official document as "a
document is not only a piece of paper but a record by whatever means." Id Com-
pare id, with discussion infra Part II.A (describing how Australia, Canada, and
the United States define documents under their respective freedom of information
acts). Clauses three, four, and five dealt with access to documents, and clauses six
through ten dealt with the machinery of giving the public access. See Freud Argu-
ments, supra note 121, at 2140 (detailing clauses of bill to Parliament). Clauses
eleven and twelve detailed, respectively, refusals and exemptions, while clause
sixteen limited fees to the costs of photocopying. See id at 2141 (emphasizing that
Parliament "do[es] not ask citizens to pay for the research that went into them").
124. See Freud Arguments, supra note 121, at 2131.
125. See id at 2141 (describing how British civil servants put one exempt sen-
tence in a document so that it will not be seen by the public and indicating that the
idea to have a provision that mandates that only exempt material be withheld came
from the United States' FOIA). Compare id, with 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994), which
is the United States FOIA provision stating "Any reasonably segregable portion of
a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of
the portions which are exempt.. .. "
126. See generally 960 PARt.. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2185 (1979) (statement of
Mr. Rees) [hereinafter Rees Arguments] (stating that one of the most important
questions is that of independent review); 960 PARE. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2186
(1979) (statement of Anthony Buck) [hereinafter Buck Arguments] (expressing his
worries for this part of the bill and stating that "[s]ome of us share the misgivings"
that Mr. Rees has stated). But cf 960 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2207 (1979)
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to supervise the Act, rather than for judicial intervention. 7 An om-
budsman, they argued, would be directly answerable to Parliament
and would compliment the principle of Ministerial Accountability.'28
Protection of Ministerial Accountability occupied a central role in
the debate yet again.'29 Opponents of the bill claimed that such leg-
islation was at odds with the principle of Ministerial Accountabil-
ity13° while advocates of the bill stated that "the democratic principle
goes far beyond doctrines of ministerial responsibility and Parlia-
mentary control."'' MPs repeatedly highlighted the democratic in-
terests involved in this legislation, such as the public's right to know
how policy decisions are formulated and to have the opportunity to
challenge them.'32 Furthermore, the idea that an informed populace
(statement of Christopher Price) [hereinafter Price Arguments] (deciding that he
would prefer to have the courts, rather than ministers, make the final decisions
about the effects of disclosure with regard to ministerial certificates and the safety
and interests of the state).
127. See Rees Arguments, supra note 126, at 2185 (stating "[I]n my strong
view, Ministers should be responsible to Parliament and to no one else for the ex-
ercise of their discretionary power"); Buck Arguments, supra note 126 (directing
the Commissioner to see to it that when this bill is discussed in Committee, alter-
natives to a Parliamentary Ombudsman are raised).
128. See 960 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2195 (1979) (statement of Mr. Perci-
val) [hereinafter Percival Arguments] (noting that Parliament should not underes-
timate the current procedure of obtaining information from Ministers, and the Om-
budsman and that "any new methods ... must be dovetailed into that concept of
ministerial responsibility").
129. See id.; Rees Arguments, supra note 126, at 2186 (stating "[w]e have to
take into account our basic constitutional system, where Ministers are directly an-
swerable to Parliament... [T]his is something that we must keep at the forefront
of our minds"). But see 960 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2201 (1979) (statement of
Mr. Cook) [hereinafter Cook Arguments] (insisting that the different constitution
argument "be thrown out of the window straight away").
130. See, e.g., Rees Arguments, supra note 126, at 2186 (stating "[j]udicial re-
view of the merits of decisions to deny documents would raise a profound consti-
tutional issue... the major point I am making is that it is this House which should
make the final decision ... not the courts").
131. 960 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2171 (1979) (statement of Mr. Heifer)
[hereinafter Heifer Arguments].
132. See 960 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2150 (1979) (statement of Arthur
Lewis) [hereinafter Lewis Arguments] (questioning why a minister or member of
the public does not have the right to know what information government civil ser-
vants base their decisions on); 960 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2164 (1979)
(statement of J.W. Rooker) [hereinafter Rooker Arguments] (stating that placing
this statute on the books would be in the "interests of democracy"); Heffer Argu-
ments, supra note 13 1, at 2170 (stating that democracy is all about an informed
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makes the government more accountable, which in turn creates
greater overall efficiency and economy, added another dimension to
the debate. 3
3
Unlike earlier debates, there was a strong consensus of support for
the aims and exigency of the bill. 34 In addition to the argument that
citizens are taxpayers and thus entitled to governmental informa-
tion,135 as heard in prior debates, 36 MiPs offered new reasons for the
bill, which included changes in technology 137 and the increase in the
size of the government.
38
public knowing what is happening, how policy is formed, and challenging the
government's decisions).
133. See, e.g., Freud Arguments, supra note 121, at 2144 (proffering that
"greater disclosure of information prevents waste of public expenditure").
134. See 960 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2197 (1979) (statement of Mr. Fraser)
[hereinafter Fraser Arguments] (proclaiming that this is a considerable day for the
advancement of human liberty and better government, to which honorable mem-
bers of both sides of the house are committed); see also Heifer Arguments, supra
note 131, at 2168 (stating that like many other members he welcomes the opportu-
nity not only to debate the question but to support the bill); Lewis Arguments, su-
pra note 132, at 2148 (listing all of the organizations and people who support such
a bill, such as "[p]eople from the Right, the Left and the Centre of political
thought"); Rees Arguments, supra note 126, at 2183 (describing how the aim is
the same, the only thing lacking is a consensus on the right approach); cf Rees Ar-
guments, supra note 126, at 2181 (recognizing wide support for the measure and
thus stating that "we must discuss not why people want a Bill, but what it will be
like in practice"). In response, one MP highlighted that such a bill would enable
Parliament to scrutinize the Executive. See Cook Arguments, supra note 129, at
2201 (comparing United Kingdom's Parliament with United States Congress and
arguing that British are bad at controlling the Executive); see also Rooker Argu-
ments, supra note 132, at 2162 (denying that the Executive is under constant scru-
tiny by Back-Bench members). Another MP commented that the bill would not be
used as a means of finding fault with the government. See 960 PARL. DEB., H.C.
(5th ser.) 2204 (1979) (statement of Mr. Warren) (concluding that the British want
more information as an attitude of mind not as a means of finding out what is at
fault in government).
135. See Freud Arguments, supra note 121, at 2138 (citing Mr. Herbert Morri-
son who argues that "it is in the national interest that the citizen and taxpayer
should be adequately informed by the Government" ).
136. See, e.g., Lewis Statements, supra note 107, at 1277 (stating [s]hould not
the electorate have the right to know? Is not the electorate made up of taxpayers
who pay the Minister's salary and who pay the salaries of all these top civil ser-
vants?").
137. See Fraser Arguments, supra note 134, at 2160 (arguing that the basic rea-
son for the bill is a rapidly changing society).
138. See 960 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2213 (1979) (statement of Mr. Lit-
terick) (stating that the tradition of relying on the discretion of ministers and civil
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One MP expressing grave doubts as to the benefits of legislation,
offered an alternative approach. 139 The alternative was a Code of
Practice. According to this MP, a Code is better than a statute be-
cause it offers more flexibility. 40 Ministers could effectively make
changes, while experimenting with the access concept.' 4 ' In all, it ap-
peared that Parliament recognized that a democracy requires an
"equilibrium between publicity, privacy and secrecy." 14 Freud's bill
made it to the committee stage, but died with the fall of the Labour
government. 
43
B. 1980-1990
Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party took control of Par-
liament in 1979, and shortly thereafter announced the "Protection of
Information Bill."' 4 4 This bill, unlike Freud's, provided no public
rights of access, 145 proposed non-challengeable ministerial public in-
terest certificates, 46 and increased the secrecy surrounding British
intelligence agencies. 47 Amid controversy, 14 the bill was dropped
servants to decide what is good for the country can no longer work because of the
"sheer size of the State mechanism").
139. See Perchival Arguments, supra note 128, at 2195 (explaining that there
are two ways of tackling a matter such as this one, legislation and the introduction
of a code, the first of which Perchival is not wholly committed to).
140. See id. (stating there are two ways of tackling this matter).
141. See id. at 2196 (arguing "that if we adopt a code of practice the Govern-
ment will be under constant pressure to make changes to it... they would be able
to accede to those pressures much more readily than if they were committed to
legislation ...").
142. Freud Arguments, supra note 121, at 2144.
143. See 55 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 738 (1984) (statement of David Steel)
[hereinafter Steel] (attributing the death of Mr. Ely Freud's Official Information
Bill to the General Election in 1979); see also PONTING, supra note 1, at 72 (stat-
ing that after the government fell, Freud's bill was automatically lost and a Con-
servative Government under Thatcher returned).
144. See generally Wilson, supra note 33, at 131 (reasoning that we should have
seen a positive approach to freedom of information from Thatcher since she had
earlier introduced a Private Members Bill to create access for citizens to meetings
of their local authority; however, her administration announced a Protection of In-
formation Bill).
145. See id. (detailing the provisions of Thatcher's Protection of Information
Bill).
146. See PONTING, supra note 1, at 73 (stating that the bill included proposals
for "conclusive ministerial certificates" that were not to be challenged in the
courts).
147. See Wilson, supra note 33, at 132 (noting that this bill created even more
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and freedom of information was "excluded altogether from the gov-
ernment agenda." 4 9 Thatcher expressed her opposition to freedom of
information legislation describing such changes as "inappropriate
and unnecessary." 0
Despite the government's opposition, from 1980 onwards, private
members of Parliament continued to introduce freedom of informa-
tion legislation."' Labour MP Frank Hooley was the first to intro-
duce such legislation, but the government ensured the bill's defeat at
its second reading. 52 As the government mounted its offensive dur-
ing the 1980s against freedom of information legislation, many cam-
paigns developed in its support.' Although a comprehensive na-
tional freedom of information statute was not enacted, statutory
rights of access to particular types of information were established,'
secrecy for the intelligence services, when it was designed to undo such secrecy).
148. See id at 132 (asserting that had the Bill become law, "Andrew Boyle
would not have been able to publish his book The Climate of Treason, which led to
the disclosure by Ms. Thatcher ... that Anthony Blunt (UP) had been a Russian
spy").
149. PONTNG, supra note 1, at 73.
150. Wilson, supra note 33, at 134 (quoting Mrs. Thatcher).
151. See generally Fisher Arguments, supra note 1, at 584 (saluting the mem-
bers of Parliament who in the past introduced FOI bills, such as Mr. Smith, Mr.
Kirkwood, Mr. Henderson and Mr. Shepard).
152. See PONTING, supra note 1, at 73 (placing responsibility on the govern-
ment).
153. See generally Wilson, supra note 1, at preface (explaining that he is the
Chairman of the 1984 Campaign for Freedom of Information in Britain). The 1984
Campaign for Freedom of Information [hereinafter the Campaign] was launched in
January 1984. See id One of its tactics has been to publish a series of "Secrets
Files." See id The Campaign has been influential in drafting bills, awarding indi-
viduals with Freedom of Information Act Awards who further the disclosure of
information, and creating a movement which would make the demand for FOI ir-
resistible. See TANT, supra note 39, at 200-46 (tracking the Campaign throughout
the 1980s until 1993). In addition to the Campaign, an Outer Circle Policy Unit
was formed and Charter 88 advocated for FOI. See generally MARK EVANS,
CHARTER 88: A SUCCESSFUL CHALLENGE TO THE BRITSH POLITICAL TRADMON?
(1995) (detailing Charter 88, which was created in 1988 as a protest to challenge
the government's satisfaction with the conditions of Britian's democracy).
154. See infra notes 274-76 (discussing Britons' rights of access to health rec-
ords and computerized and manual personal files information held by the govern-
ment); TANT, supra note 39, at 202 (arguing that the Campaign's tactics for a
"Freud-like single FOI Act" have been set aside "in favour of a new piecemeal
strategy aimed at gaining a 'toehold', which would subsequently facilitate exten-
sion of the FOI principle").
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and a Local Government Access to Information Act was passed.'"
Many Britons cannot understand why the Government believes that
the public should have a right to information on the local level but
not on the national level." 6 This section addresses that question. Spe-
cifically, this section examines the Private Member's bill that fol-
lowed Hooley's bill." 7 Blair should pay close attention to the criti-
cism that this minister received regarding the degree of detail in his
speech before Parliament in order to avoid making the same error.'58
In addition, this section examines the Parliamentary debates sur-
rounding the enactment of the local access statute and reviews the
public's experience with the Act. Perhaps if Blair frames his statute
along the lines of the local statute, his legislation will finally become
a reality. Blair might refrain from this action since the local Act does
not contain an extensive appellate procedure," 9 and local govern-
ments remain criticized for being "unduly closed." 60
1. Steel's Ten Minute Rule
Given Hooley's unsuccessful attempt, David Steel decided to in-
troduce his freedom of information bill in a unique fashion. 6' Using
the Ten Minute Rule procedure,'62 Steel introduced a bill that was
155. See infra Part II.B.2 (detailing the Local Government (Access to Informa-
tion) Act).
156. See BIRKINSHAW, supra note 9, at 138 (depicting the Local Government
(Access to Information) Act as a "FOIA for local government" and stating that
there "is an immediate irony in the fact that it was passed with the approval of the
Government, which had steadfastly refused such legislation for itself').
157. See infra Part II.B.1 (reviewing MP David Steel's Ten Minute Rule on
freedom of information).
158. See infra notes 172-74 (providing MP Dennis Skinner's criticism of the
narrow definition Steel provided to Parliament as to the types of information Brit-
ons would have access to under his Bill).
159. See infra Part II.B.I (describing how the Act leaves review to the "proper
officer" and chairman of a meeting).
160. DAWN OLIVER, GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: THE SEARCH FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY, EFFECTIVENESS AND CITIZENSHIP 178 (1991).
161. See Steel, supra note 143, at 738 (confirming that "it is unusual for a party
leader to use the ten-minute rule procedure" and justifying his action on the basis
that it was done "in order to draw maximum attention to the measure itself').
162. See MARSH & READ, supra note 120, at 12 (stating that Private Members
take advantage of Standing Order Number 13, the Ten-Minute Rule, to introduce
legislation). Each week, two Members are allowed to make a short speech, usually
no more than ten minutes long, asking their colleagues to support the introduction
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promoted by the 1984 Campaign for Freedom of Information'63 and
modeled on Freud's defeated "Official Information Bill." 14 Ideo-
logically Steel, like Freud, proposed a "total change of attitude"
from his colleagues. 65
Steel differentiated his bill from Freud's by excluding opinions or
advice tendered to ministers for policy-making purposes." He did
include defense and security matters, relations with foreign govern-
ments, law enforcement and legal proceedings, commercial confi-
dences, and individual privacy as exemptions.1 67 Additionally, he as-
signed the role of final review regarding disputes about exemptions
to a Parliamentary Commissioner.'" Steel directed his peers to weigh
the costs associated with the Commissioner against the current sub-
stantial costs of secrecy when considering this provision.1 69
In order to gain the government's support, Steel advanced four
main reasons why it should favor freedom of information including
the fact that "regardless of which party is in office, the processes of
government and the power of the Government over the individual are
increasing all the time."' 70 Thus, a proper balance between openness
and secrecy is necessary.'
Due to the procedural nature of this debate, only one NP re-
of a new measure. See id
163. See Steel, supra note 143, at 738 (assigning the promotion of his Bill to the
1984 Campaign for FOI, "a body that is supported by Members of all parties").
164. See id (informing Parliament that the "text of the Bill follows closely the
attempt by my hon. Friend ... Mr. Freud").
165. See id (stating that "[m]y bill proposes a total change of attitude so that
everything shall be open unless specific exemption is made").
166. See id (stating that this provision is one important addition to the Bill
Freud introduced).
167. See id (listing the exemptions contained in the Bill).
168. See id (accepting that judgment would fall under the Parliamentary Com-
missioner for Administration).
169. See Steel, supra note 143, at 738 (accepting that there would have to be an
enlargement of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration's office but
noting that "open government costs money, that must be measured against the
wastefulness of closed government").
170. See id at 740 (pointing out that in addition to this issue extending over
party lines, government politics would be more folly considered, better under-
stood, and more acceptable with a freedom of information act).
171. See id (indicating the current imbalance in Great Britain where the Gov-
ernment's privilege to conceal is valued more highly than the people's right to
know).
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sponded to Steel. According to this NP, Steel failed to detail what
information individuals would have access to under the Bill. 12 Addi-
tionally, he emphasized that Steel did not mention and "would never
wish to mention" how such an act could be used to expose the slush
fund of Steel's Liberal party."' According to this MP, a "pandora's
box" opens and information such as the financial accounts of politi-
cal parties must be revealed under the premise that the public has a
right to know. 1 4 Ultimately, the debate ended with the MP criticizing
Steel for his lack of support of Hooley's Bill.'
Parliament ultimately defeated Steel's bill, even though it had the
support of the Labour, Social Democratic, and Liberal Parties, since
the Conservative Party followed the lead of Thatcher. 76 Now that
Blair controls the government and stands firmly committed to the en-
actment of such legislation 177 the time is ripe for its implementa-
tion.' Blair need only maintain the multi-party support for the ini-
172. See 55 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 740 (1984) (statement of Dennis Skin-
ner) [hereinafter Skinner] (expressing his displeasure over the very narrow defimi-
tion Steel has given of what is needed and what people will be able to get to know
if the Bill is passed); cf id, at 741 (arguing that the bill itself is too narrow and
stating that "[m]any of us would wish to support a much broader bill, but the nar-
rowly defined one that the leader of the Liberal party is trying to sneak through is a
bit of propaganda and gimmickry").
173. See id. at 740 (exposing the existence of a Liberal Party slush fund).
174. See id. at 740-41 (explaining how he would use the FOI Bill to examine the
Liberal Party's accounts because "[t]he public has a right to know what makes po-
litical parties tick").
175. See id. at 741 (condemning Steel, who was not on "sabbatical," for his ab-
sence from the House of Commons on the day that Hooley's Freedom of Informa-
tion Bill was introduced).
176. See Wilson, supra note 33, at 135 (describing how the "Prime Minister has
given her lead and the Party largely followed" thus failing to make this initiative
and positive results an all party issue).
177. See FOI Unit, supra note 16 (using the term "The Government's Commit-
ments" as the initial heading on its home page, and providing under this heading
the pledges made in the Labour Election Manifesto and the Queen's Speech);
Cabinet Office, supra note 16; Timmins, supra note 14, at 10 (providing the Chan-
cellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's assertment that "the government was 'deadly
serious' about enacting such a bill").
178. See Clwyd, supra note 14, at 17 (warning that the passage of time before
legislating will be detrimental); see also The Freedom Files, TIMES (London), May
9, 1997 (indicating that moving such a bill up the "legislative queue" requires "a
forceful champion"). Compare id., with ANDY MCSMrTH, FACES OF LABOUR: THE
INSIDE STORY 293-362 (1996) (entitling chapter seven of his book "Calling Tony
Blair" and describing him as a man "blessed with a sharp mind," who "applies
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tiative. 179
2. The Local Government (Access to Information) Act
Although local governments are not governed by the Official Se-
crets Act, the "legal regime of secrecy to which the 1911 Official
Secrets Act gave rise infected local government too." "" During par-
liamentary debates over the local act, one MP described local gov-
ernment as even more secretive than the national government be-
cause there is not the same level of pressure for information from the
local media.'
Generally, the measure opens up subcommittees to the public,
makes the minutes of all committees available, requires reports that
are discussed at meetings to be made public, and provides the general
public and officials with access to documents like background pa-
pers, interim reports, and research data."n Although the statute pro-
vides Britons with "access" to official information, as its name de-
notes, this statute primarily deals with the concept of government
openness-making government meetings more open.'83 Nevertheless,
himself with a steady and determined intelligence" and "all the tasks that a mod-
em politician is required to do Blair does well").
179. See Richard Norton-Taylor, Labour Leaders May Sideline Freedom of In-
formation Act, GUARDIAN, Feb. 12, 1997, at I 1 (detailing the Liberal Democrats
backing of a Labour introduced Freedom of Information Act).
180. OLIVER, supra note 160, at 176; cf 72 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 547
(1985) (statement of Sir Bernard Braine) [hereinafter Braine States] (stating "[i]f
we suffer from the British disease of excessive secrecy at the top, it is not surpris-
ing to find it throughout the administrative structure and operating at local gov-
ernment level").
181. See 72 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 544 (1985) (statement of Mr. Austin
Mitchell) [hereinafter Mitchell States] (comparing the level of competition among
local newspapers long ago with today).
182. See 72 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 520 (1985) (statement of Robin Squire)
[hereinafter Squire States] (stating the benefits of the Local Government (Access
to Information) Bill). According to Squire, the Private Member responsible for the
Bill, "[p]ublicity is the greatest and most effective check against action." Id
(quoting the words of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher which she spoke in Par-
liament when she introduced her Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act of
1960). Accordingly, Squire created this measure to address "the important issues
which are unnecessarily taken in private" by local government authorities. Id at
522.
183. See BIRKINSHAW, supra note 9, at 51-60. Accordingly, the Local Govern-
ment (Access to Information) Act more closely resembles the United States Sun-
shine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994) rather than the Freedom of Information Act.
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examination of this statute and the debates leading to its enactment
are important because many MPs view the act as a comprehensive
freedom of information act.184
During the debates, MPs argued that such legislation would inter-
fere with the need to retain confidentiality in certain areas,"8 5 that the
measure was too costly, impractical, and unworkable, 86 and that it
would have negative effects on the candor of opinion shared between
officials.'87 One MP expressed his fear that officials would conduct
"The Sunshine Act ... is an 'open meeting' law allowing access to the meetings
of those agencies within its scope. Its aim is to open up to the public portions of
the 'deliberative processes' of certain agencies." Id. at 59; see also 5 U.S.C. §
552(b) (1994) (stating that "[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c), every portion
of every meeting of an agency shall be open to public observation"). In compari-
son, the Freedom of Information Act addresses public access to agency records,
rather than meetings. See BIRKINSHAW, supra note 9, at 51.
184. See 72 PARL. DEB, H.C. (6th Ser.) 554 (1985) (statement of Piers Mer-
chant) [hereinafter Merchant States] (stating that "freedom of information is not
just in the interests of the press and the public. .. [i]t is also in the overriding in-
terest of the councils"); see also Braine States, supra note 180, at 547 (stating
"[h]ere is local government moving ahead of Parliament").
185. See 72 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th Ser.) 558-59 (1985) (statement of Mr. Fair-
bum) [hereinafter Fairbum States] (stating that he is not in favor of secrecy but
understands the benefits of confidentiality and trust). Mr. Fairbairn then advances
particular examples and reasons why certain matters should be kept confidential.
See id. The main reason he gives for confidentiality is the need to avoid hurting
those members of the public involved. See id.; see also 72 PA.RL. DEB., H.C. (6th
ser.) 522 (1985) (statement of Mr. Dafydd Wigley) [hereinafter Wigley States]
(confirming with Mr. Squire that the Bill gets at the "completely unnecessary pri-
vacy" since "[t]here are matters small as well as great which may need to be kept
private because of their content"). Specifically, Mr. Wigley indicates the need to
keep private personal matters of confidentiality that arise in social services com-
mittees. See id.
186. See Squire States, supra note 182, at 526 (providing what he foresaw as the
three main arguments against the enactment of such legislation); see also Fairburn
States, supra note 185, at 558 (arguing that the Bill would have "massive man-
power implications for local authorities" and the "financial implications ... are
incalculable but inevitably huge").
187. See generally Fairbum States, supra note 185, at 560 (quoting COSLA as
to the negative effects such a measure would have on the interchanges between of-
ficials). COSLA stated the following:
It will mean the end of the officers engaging in frank and meaningful written ex-
changes of view if they are to be the subject of public scrutiny. No officer is going to
give a completely open opinion on a matter if he knows he may be called upon to jus-
tify his view in public or even in court.
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all business over the telephone, thus increasing secrecy."' Diametri-
cal to these arguments were the calls for an extension of the reach of
the Bill. 9
As a whole, Parliament and the Government supported this meas-
ure, offering many reasons for its enactment.'" As during the debates
on the national level for freedom of information legislation, MPs ar-
gued that such a bill must be enacted as a matter of principle because
open government is an essential right of all citizens. 9' One M
stated that it is generally accepted that information is the "fuel of
democracy.""19 As such, legislation providing increased access to in-
formation and governmental accountability is central at the local
level which "still represents the most immediate form of account-
ability." 193
Additionally, MPs argued that because local authorities are the
biggest employers, they should set an example of" industrial democ-
racy" by providing employers, workers, and union trade representa-
tives with all known information.' 9' MPs argued that disclosure of
188. See id (advising every English local authority if this Bill is passed to
"never commit anything to writing-always do business on the telephone"); 72
PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 542 (1985) (statement of Charles Irving) [hereinafter
Irving States] (describing how one local councillor implemented this strategy in
his town). This councillor made all decisions on the telephone, and the commit-
tees never met. See id The phone deliberations were later reported to the council
and approved. See id Thus, the councillor effectively excluded his colleagues and
the public from participation in the deliberations. See id
189. See Merchant States, supra note 184, at 551 (complimenting Squires on the
work he has done, but criticizing him because "in some areas the Bill does not go
far enough"); 72 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 569 (1985) (statement of Mr. John
Fraser) [ hereinafter Fraser States] (stating that he would like the Bill's provisions
to be extended).
190. See 72 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 576-77 (statement of Mr. William Wal-
degrave, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Environment) (noting that
there has been near unanimity in the debate and urging that the "Government wel-
come the Bill").
191. See Mitchell States, supra note 181, at 543 (declaring that "[o]pen gov-
ernment-the right to know-is basic to democracy").
192. 72 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 548 (1985) (statement of Mr. Michael Han-
cock) [hereinafter Hancock States].
193. Squire States, supra note 182, at 520.
194. See 72 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 556 (1985) (statement of Mr. Ernie
Roberts) [hereinafter Roberts States] (arguing that because local authorities are the
biggest employers in the country, they should set an example in industrial democ-
racy). Roberts added that he learned about industrial democracy from his trade
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this information will benefit future government-business negotiations
and influence the private sector to act in the same manner. 195 Stating
this point on a more general level, one MP said, "We are not just
tackling local government in the Bill, but taking on a wide aspect of
our society which affects all kinds of relationships." '96
Restructuring of relationships played a central role in the discus-
sion of this measure. Specifically, one of the main reasons advanced
for the Bill was the need to improve the local government's status
and its relationship with the electorate. 97 According to most MPs,
secrecy alienates the electorate, inevitably leading to suspicion and
unease and ultimately to a lack of confidence on the part of the pub-
lic.198 This bill would remove this suspicion, which is harmful to a
good and efficient democracy, and force authorities to be more re-
sponsible and clear with their decisions. 9 Local government offi-
cials could do a better job because they would have access to all in-
formation to which they are currently denied. °°
Furthermore, MPs argued that a new, stronger partnership was
necessary between the electorate and local government officials to
tackle the national government's attack on local democracy.2 ' Addi-
union. See id. "All of its members have the right to know everything. The rules
provide that members can get any information and find out how anyone voted on
any issue. They have real democratic control." Id.
195. See id. (asserting that both sides should have information on which a deci-
sion is being made).
196. 72 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 574 (1985) (statement of Mr. Michael
Knowles) [hereinafter Knowles States].
197. 72 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 538-39 (1985) (statement of Mr. Simon
Hughes) [hereinafter Hughes States] (charging that such secretive behavior exists
in the Southwark Borough Council and does no good to local government, nor "to
the status of local government anywhere").
198. Mitchell States, supra note 184, at 546 (stating additionally that "[s]ecrecy
breeds uncertainty... [s]ecrecy breeds rumors, circulates trivia and leads to suspi-
cion, which is harmful to good and efficient democracy").
199. See, e.g., id. (arguing that "[o]peness forces authorities to make better,
more responsible and more clear-cut decisions").
200. See, e.g., Hughes States, supra note 197, at 539 (discussing how his col-
league, the leader of the Liberal group on Hackney Council, took the council to
court because it denied him access to necessary information). After the court in the
Hackney Council case found that the Council had "acted unlawfully" by denying
the councillor access to information, the ensuing openness put government offi-
cials "in a better position to do [their] job[s] and to advise people." Id.
201. See generally Roberts States, supra note 194, at 527-28 (making the case
for open government at the local level "when local democracy is under attack
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tionally, highlighted in this debate was the economic relationship
between the local and national government. 20 ' Thatcher indicated her
concern over the expense of local government, providing insight as
to the reasons why the government supported this measure when it is
so against its implementation on the national level.20 3 Simply, ineffi-
ciency on the lower level, stimulated by a lack of accountability, was
proving too costly for the national Government."M
Unlike debates on the national level for freedom of information
legislation, MPs here could draw support from experiences of certain
local authorities who adopted open government policies prior to the
enactment of this Bill. For example, the experience of Bradford,
which was the first local authority in Britain to adopt an open gov-
ernment policy, dispelled fears of administrative burdens and exces-
sively high costs. 20 5 "Bradford has been operating a freedom of in-
formation policy, and it has worked." 206
Although MPs could have argued that such a bill was unnecessary
from central Government, with rate capping and threats of abolition"). Further-
more, Mr. Roberts stated, "democratically elected local government must gather
strength unto itself to resist the efforts of central Government to interfere more and
more in local affairs." Id
202. See Squires States, supra note 182, at 520 (noting "the importance of the
role that local government plays in the [national] economy").
203. See id at 520 (beginning his speech with a discussion on how Thatcher
"was worried about local government expenditure").
204. See id ("underlin[ing], above all, the importance of the role that the local
government plays in the economy."); see also THATCHER'S LAw 28 (Andrew
Gamble & Celia Wells eds., 1989) (stating that "[Iln short, the Government en-
tirely lost control over local government expenditure").
205. See 72 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 576 (1985) (statement of Mr. Jeremy
Hanley) (declaring that "the costs are minimal"); see also 72 PARL. DEB., H.C.
(6th ser.) 572 (1985) (statement of Mr. Geoff Lawler) [hereinafter Lawler States]
(boasting about the openness of government that his constituency has achieved and
negating the arguments of those who say that freedom of information policies are
too costly). The cost of implementing the policy in regard to Lawler's constitu-
ency, he claims, is "estimated to be a mere £2,000." Id Therefore, he argues,
"Some of the fears of the Honorable members are therefore somewhat exagger-
ated" Id In regard to the administrative burden such policies impose, Lawler
stated, "[I]t is the council's view, and mine, that the time that is spent ... is worth
while." Id
206. Lawler States, supra note 205, at 573. See generally Anthony Clipson,
Bradford's 'Open Government' Experience, in OPEN GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF
THE PROSPECTS OF OPEN GOVERNMENT WITIN THE LIMITATIONS OF THE BRMISH
POLITICAL SYSTEM 123-133 (1987) (providing a thorough accounting of Brad-
ford's "Open Government" experience).
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because of cities like Bradford, which opened their governments vol-
untarily; most argued that, left to their own devices, many local gov-
ernments would never voluntary accept the freedom of information
proposals in Squire's bill.2"7 Voluntary acceptance would not occur
mainly because this "bill is designed to try to make authorities jus-
tify secrecy and confidentiality, and secrecy is endemic in our sys-
tem." 208
Despite opposition, Squire's Bill was passed and stands as law to-
day.209 More than ten years after its enactment, the act has improved
public rights of access to local authority information and meetings.2
Some contend, however, that councils are still "unduly closed"
21
'
and such statutory intervention has not been "pervasive or necessar-
ily influential. '21 2 The bill was passed deliberately without contain-
ing a special appellate procedure to resolve certain matters inside the
authority.2 3 Since the bill leaves "important matters of judgment in
the hands of the 'proper officer' and the chairman of a meeting,"
there is growing support for "a new statutory power of assistance for
individuals wishing to challenge a decision by their local authority in
the court 214 Hence, a freedom of information act implemented on
the national level might not wish to make the same mistake.
During the debates, one MP realized that, although this Bill proba-
bly would not prevent the abuses it was created to decrease, "it
should be enacted in order to establish a benchmark of standards and
[make] it clear what the criteria of local councils should be."2 5 Blair
207. See, e.g., Hancock States, supra note 192, at 548 (contrasting the Bradford
experience with those of Portsmouth and Hampshire, two local authorities where
there has been "a progressive decline" in information forthcoming to the public).
208. Knowles States, supra note 196, at 573.
209. See BIRKINsHAW, supra note 9, at 138 (noting the "irony in the fact that
[the Bill] was passed with the approval of the Government, which had steadfastly
refused such legislation for itself').
210. See id (maintaining that the Act provides greater public access).
211. OLIVER, supra note 160.
212. BIRKINSHAW, supra note 9, at 194.
213. See BIRKINsHAW, supra note 9, at 140 (relating how the Widdicombe re-
port of 1986 recommended "that a new statutory power of assistance for individu-
als wishing to challenge a decision by their local authority in the court should be
made available").
214. See id.
215. 72 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 565 (1985) (statement of Mr. Norris) (ar-
guing that the value of the Bill lies in establishing a benchmark of standards simi-
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should use this argument to gain support for his measure, although it
appears that the legislation succeeded because the national govern-
ment wished to control the costs and affairs of the local govern-
ment.
2 16
C. 1990-1997
Succeeding Thatcher as Prime Minister, John Major began the
1990s committed to reform. Specifically, he promised to "sweep
away many of the cobwebs of secrecy which needlessly veil too
much of government business."217
Major latched on to Citizen's Charters as a means of attaining his
goals. Citizen's Charters were intended to "secure better services to
the public by giving 'the citizen a better deal through extending con-
sumer choice and competition."' 2 8 Such charters are now prevalent
at all levels of British government." 9 Essentially, the Charters seek to
ensure greater efficiency in service delivery from governmental de-
partments by making officials more accountable." Throughout Par-
liamentary debates in the 1990s for freedom of information, MPs
cited the Citizen's Charters as evidence of the government's com-
mitment to openness, efficiency, and accountability.? Many MPs
lar to other legislation such as the Race Relations Act of 1976 and the equal op-
portunities legislation).
216. See supra notes 202-04 (discussing the important role that the local gov-
ernment plays in the national economy).
217. Richard Norton-Taylor & Nikki Knewstub, Code of Practice to Fight Se-
crecy, GUARDIAN, July 16, 1993, at I (quoting John Major).
218. J.A. Chandler, Introduction to THE CrrIZEN'S CHARTER 1, 2-3 (J.A. Chan-
dler ed., 1996).
219. See id (detailing the success of Citizen's Charters).
220. See Howard Elcock, What Price Citizenship? Public Management and the
Citizen's Charter, in THE CITIZEN'S CHARTER supra note 218, at 24, 33-37 (distin-
guishing three types of accountability and arguing that "accountability down-
wards" is the main concern of the Citizen's Charter). Elcock defines "account-
ability downwards" as accountability "to those receiving goods and services,
whether as citizens, clients, customers and consumers." Id at 34. This is to be
compared with "accountability upwards" to superiors and "accountability out-
wards" to professionals or colleagues. Id at 33.
221. See 219 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 613-14 (1993) (statements of Mr. John
Wheeler) [hereinafter Wheeler Comments] (commending the Government for
changing the political culture of government in regards to the release of official
information and focusing on the Citizen's Charter as evidence of a move in that
direction); 219 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 601 (1993) (statement of the Chancel-
lor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Mr. William Waldegrave) [hereinafter Waldegrave
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asserted that a comprehensive freedom of information statute was not
necessary because the Citizen's Charters and additional statutes pro-
vided access to and efficiency in government.2 Other MPs, how-
ever, were quick with responses to rebuke this sentiment.223
Continuing the reform, Prime Minister Major ordered a White Pa-
per on Open Government. 24 The White Paper led to the development
of a Code of Practice on Access to Official Information. This code
currently controls information disclosure in Britain. In short, the
Code provides a non-statutory right of access to government infor-
mation, except where exemptions apply.225 Persons with complaints
have access to an internal departmental review, with final recourse to
an independent Parliamentary Ombudsman. 26
Many argue that the Code was introduced to forestall demands for
a freedom of information act and specifically to quell the public sup-
port for Mark Fisher's Right to Know Bill.227 Mark Fisher, a private
member of Parliament, brought a bill entitled the "Right to Know"
before the House of Commons in 1992.228 This section examines
Argues] (offering the Citizen's Charter as an example of a "comprehensive cam-
paign for opening up information").
222. See infra notes 272-76 (discussing the Local Government (Access to In-
formation) Act, the Citizen's Charter, the Data Protection Act, the Access to Per-
sonal Files Act, and the Access to Health Records Act).
223. See infra notes 265-68 (providing MPs arguments that a freedom of infor-
mation act is necessary for Britain's democracy to reach adulthood, to improve
other countries views of Britain and to allow Briton's access to daily information
that would not endanger national security).
224. See Chris Moncrieff, Ministers Take New Broom to Whitehall Secrecy,
PRESS Ass'N NEWSFILE, July 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
ARCNWS File (detailing the origins of the Government's White Paper on Open
Government).
225. See generally Cabinet Office, Code of Practice on Access to Government
Information (visited July 11, 1997) <http://www.open.gov.uk/m-of-g/codete.html>
[hereinafter Code]; infra Part II.C.2 (detailing the Code of Practice on Access to
Government Information); see also Cabinet Office, Explaining the Code of Prac-
tice on Access to Government Information (visited July 11, 1997) <http://www.
open.gov.uk/m-of-g/code97.html> [hereinafter Code Guide].
226. See infra notes 306-09 and accompanying text (explaining the review proc-
ess under the Code).
227. See, e.g., Stephen Ward, Slow Response to Code on Freedom of Informa-
tion, INDEP., Mar. 9, 1995, at 8 (stating "it was introduced to forestall demands for
a freedom of information act similar to those in the United States and several
Commonwealth Countries").
228. See 219 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th Ser.) 583 (1993).
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Fisher's Bill and the debates surrounding its failed enactment. Such
review is necessary in order to make recommendations to Blair be-
cause this was the last major freedom of information bill to come be-
fore Parliament. After this analysis, part two of this section details
the Government's White Paper on Open Government and the Code
of Practice on Access to Official Information. Generally, this section
demonstrates the pattern of Labour's attempt to enact freedom of in-
formation legislation and the Government's repeated rejection of
such a measure. 9 As it stands in Britain today, ministers still decide
what information is placed in the public domain."0 Many fear that
Blair might not be able to break this tradition. Even worse some fear
that he or Parliament might merely codify the Code of Practice. '
The disadvantages of such actions are highlighted below.
1. Fisher's Right to Know Bill
Fisher, unlike his predecessors, entitled his bill in a way that high-
lights the crux of the issue present in freedom of information de-
bates.z2 According to Fisher, the Bill focuses on two key ques-
tions."  "The first is, who should know? Should it be the
229. See supra Part II.B.1 (detailing the Government's defeat of MP David
Steel's Ten Minute Rule on freedom of information because the Conservative
Party followed the lead of Margaret Thatcer).
230. See Minister Hails Move to More Open Government, PRESS ASS'N
NEWsFILE, July 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File
(quoting Labour member Dr. Marjorie Mowlam's distaste for the White Paper on
Open Government, mainly because "in the end, it will be the Government minister
that decides what information is available to the public").
231. See Richard Norton-Taylor, Commentary: Whatch [sic] Out: Secrecy's
About (Again), GUARDIAN, May 9, 1997, at 21 (noting that "[i]t will be ironic in-
deed if the F.O.I. Bill which finally emerges amounts to little more than putting in
statutory form the Conservatives' code of practice on open government, with its
many exemptions").
232. See 219 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 607 (1993) (statement of Mr. Jeff
Rooker) [hereinafter Rooker Comments] (stating "[o]ver the years, people who
have campaigned for freedom of information have been asked by Ministers what
they want to know... Turning the title 'round the other way and stating that peo-
ple have a right to know ... is a clever means of highlighting the crux of the is-
sue"); see also 219 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 616 (1993) (statement of Mr. Don
Foster) [hereinafter Foster Comments] (congratulating Fisher on the title of the
Bill).
233. See Fisher Arguments, supra note 1, at 583 (stating that his Bill focuses on
two key questions).
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Government and civil servants, or all of us? The second is, who
should decide what we know? Should it be Ministers or a form of in-
dependent arbitration?" 2
3 4
Fisher answers these questions during the debates by detailing the
clauses of his Bill, which had its origins in Freud's Official Informa-
tion Bill.2"3 Fisher leaned heavily on the experiences of Australia and
Canada, both of which introduced freedom of information legislation
in 1982 and have parliamentary and judicial systems similar to Brit-
ai".236
MPs criticized Fisher's Bill as too large, a "blockbuster Bill" with
over 30 clauses.237 Under the Bill, the public is granted statutory
rights of access to "records held by public authorities" and a system
for review of decisions denying the assertion of these rights.238 In ad-
dition, the Official Secrets Act of 1989 is reformed and the Compa-
nies Act of 1985 is amended.239 Accordingly, the answer to Fisher's
first question is that everyone should know what information the
government holds.
Specifically, the Bill requires departments to publish lists of in-
formation contained in their departments so that the public will know
234. See id.
235. See id at 584 (stating that "[the Bill] has its origins in the Official Infor-
mation Bill introduced by a former Liberal Member of Parliament, Sir Clement
Freud, in 1979, and in several Bills introduced by other hon. Members").
236. See id. at 585 (stating that the Bill leans heavily on the experiences of
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand for the reasons mentioned in the text); discus-
sion infra Part III (discussing the access statutes of Canada and Australia).
237. See Waldegrave Argues, supra note 221, at 604 (characterizing Fisher's
Right to Know Bill as a "blockbuster Bill" and a "Christmas tree of a Bill because
it is equivalent to four or five Bills put together"). Mr. Waldegrave questioned
whether this bill is the biggest Private Member's bill ever. See id.
238. See BIRKINsHAW, supra note 9, at 337 (quoting the text of the Right to
Know Bill).
239. See Fisher Arguments, supra note 1, at 587 (detailing the provisions of the
Right to Know Bill). This Bill would amend the Companies Act of 1985 by re-
quiring companies to publish in their annual reports all instances in which they
were found to be in violation of environmental protection laws, health and safety
laws, discrimination laws, and other consumer protections. See id. The need for
this provision was illustrated by Des Wilson and his Campaign for FOI. See
Maurice Frankel, How Secrecy Protects the Polluter, in THE SECRETS FILE: THE
CASE FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN BRITAIN TODAY 22-58 (Des Wilson ed.,
1984) (looking at the denial of information by factories and companies in regard to
the environment).
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what information is available. 40 When bodies receive requests they
have thirty days to produce the documents unless the documents fall
within one of the exempted categories detailed in the statute.24" ' The
categories of exemptions include: national security, defense and in-
ternational relations, the enforcement of law, personal privacy, and
commercial confidentiality. 42 If the publication of the information
requested would cause "significant damage" to the above categories,
such information can be withheld.243
Review of decisions would initially take place internally by the
department who ordered the withholding and next by an independent
Parliamentary Information Commissioner.'" The Commissioner
would have to report annually to Parliament,245 and would have the
power of the court to call for documents and order disclosure.246 If
there is still a conflict, an independent Tribunal would make the final
decision. 47 Such a mechanism was not present in prior bills.248
240. See Fisher Arguments, supra note 1, at 585 (summarizing the provisions of
his Bill).
241. See id (describing the obtaining of information under the Bill).
242. See id (listing the categories of protected information contained in his
Bill).
243. See id
244. See Fisher Arguments, supra note 1, at 587-88 (detailing the review
mechanism under the Right to Know Bill); see also BiRKINSHAW, supra note 9, at
340-341 (providing a thorough discussion of the Right to Know Bill's review
mechanism).
245. See Fisher Arguments, supra note 1, at 587 (stating that the "commissioner
4-ill lay an annual report before Parliament").
246. See id at 586 (stating that the "Commissioner and tribunal shall have pow-
ers of the court to call for information or records and their findings will have the
same force as a court order").
247. See id (describing the role of the tribunal). The Tribunal and Commis-
sioner are appointed by Her Majesty, on the reccomendation of the Prime Minister,
the Leader of the Opposition, and a Select Committee. See id The tribunal has the
same substantial powers as the Information Commissioner, in that its recommen-
dations would have the same force as a court order. See BIRKINSHAW, supra note
9, at 340 (comparing the levels of power between the tribunal and commissioner).
Compared with Canada's Information Commissioner, who can only request but
not compel disclosure, the British Commissioner would have increased power. See
id (differentiating the review mechanism in Fisher's Right to Know Bill with that
of Canada); infra notes 371-76 (explaining the review process under Canada's Ac-
cess to Information Act).
248. See supra notes 126-28, 213 (discussing the creation of a Parliamentary
Ombudsman to supervise information disclosure under Freud's Official Informa-
tion Bill and the lack of a special appellate procedure under Squire's Local (Ac-
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In order to appease the Government and bring this mechanism in
line with the principle of Ministerial Accountability, Fisher argued
that the workings of the Tribunal would be subject to the Select
Committee, which appoints the Commissioner.249 Fisher stated that
an independent mechanism was necessary because "[i]nformation is
too powerful and important to place in the hands of any politicians..
. . [W]hen Ministers make a mistake, whatever party is in office,
there is always temptation to save their embarrassment." 20 Thus, the
answer to Fisher's second question is that independent commission-
ers and tribunals decide what information is to be withheld, not min-
isters.
In order to win the support of civil service organizations, the Bill
included an exemption for policy advice. 5' Unlike other countries
where a distinction is drawn between the deliberative process of de-
cision making and the post decision stage,252 Fisher was forced to
distinguish between "policy advice" and technical and expert advice
that officials receive, 53 the latter of which would be disclosable.
In response to the trials of Tisdall, Ponting, and Wright, Fisher
proposed reform to the Official Secrets Act and tailored his provi-
sions according to these incidents.2 4 Fisher sought to end the abso-
lute offense of any disclosure and provided the possibility of a public
cess to Information) Bill).
249. See Fisher Arguments, supra note 1, at 587 (responding to Mr. John
Bowis's concern that this Bill would be "taking from Parliament a power that he
would not wish to take away-the power to assess, monitor and question the tribu-
nal").
250. Fisher Arguments, supra note 1, at 586.
251. See BIRKiNSHAW, supra note 9, at 344 (asserting that "[t]he Bill has many
interesting and useful aspects ... [b]ut it also has drawbacks which were forced
upon the proponents by bodies representing officials in order to secure their sup-
port," such as civil service organizations).
252. See id. at 345 (comparing the Right to Know Bill's provisions for informa-
tion containing policy advice with Canada's policy advice provisions); see also
infra notes 415-25 and accompanying text (detailing the provisions in the United
States' Freedom of Information Act that deal with policy advice).
253. See Fisher Arguments, supra note 1, at 586 (maintaining that under the
Right to Know Bill, policy advice given by civil servants is exempt, but not tech-
nical and expert advice they receive).
254. See generally id. at 587 (harmonizing the reform of the Official Secrets Act
and the defenses of public interest and prior disclosure to the trial of Clive Pon-
ting).
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interest defense and defense of prior publication." 5
During the debates Fisher told Parliament: "We have everything
to gain: better democracy, better debate, better decisions, better effi-
ciency, better accountability, and even greater credibility."" 6 He also
noted that what impressed him most while campaigning for the Bill
on the road was its ability to empower individuals.2" Under the Bill,
Britons would be able to have greater knowledge with which to make
important choices in their lives.28 Specifically, Fisher highlighted a
tragic incident in Bradford, which he and many allege could have
been prevented with a provision like the Right to Know Bill."9
Certain MPs repeated his arguments while other Mls offered new
255. See id (stating that "[t]he Bill would also reform the Official Secrets Act
[of] 1989 ... by ending the absolute offence of any disclosure"). The Public Inter-
est Defense that Fisher advocated was similar to the one allowed in the Ponting
Trial, but not allowed in the Tisdall Trial. See supra notes 55, 63 (detailing the
lack of a public interest defense at Tisdall's trial and the assertion of such a de-
fense at Ponting's trial). In addition, the defense of prior publication had its ori-
gins in the Wright Trial. See supra note 74 (explaining how the Australian courts
refused to enjoin the publication of Peter Wright's novel in Australia since it was
previously published in the United States and Canada).
256. Fisher Arguments, supra note I, at 596. Mr. Fisher stated that the Bill
would lead to better public debate because it would be based on information and
informed choices. See id at 587. The Bill would lead to better decisions being
taken by Ministers because their work would be open to the public for scrutiny.
See id at 588. Futhermore, Fisher used a "Thatcherite Argument," contending that
freedom of information would help make a "better and more efficient use of what-
ever Government expenditure was available." Id at 589.
257. See id at 590 (stating that "[m]ore than anything else, the important point
is that the Bill would empower the individuals").
258. See id (describing the increased choice and knowledge the public would
receive under the Right to Know Bill).
259. See id (stating that choices do "not apply simply to matters of food and
safety... [t]here are sometimes tragic consequences from not having information
and from not making choices"). Fisher explained that the government had known
for years that the combination of accumulated rubbish and wood stands was dan-
gerous and had even predicted an accident like Bradford's. See id Yet, they re-
mained silent. See id See generally, Cigarette Probably Caused Bradfire Fire, In-
quiry Told, REUTERS, June 5, 1985 (explaining that a cigarette dropped below a
seat onto rubbish which caused a fire that swept through the Bradford City Sta-
dium killing 56 people); Alan Nixon, I Still Find It Hard to Talk About What Hap-
pened. . . I Could See The Fire As I Looked For My Family But Didn't Realise
What Was Happening; Stuart McCall; on The Bradford Traged, of 1985, PEOPLE,
May 7, 1995, at 54 (leaving a "lasting scar" on the people of Bradford, this Rang-
ers Star "opens his heart" to relate how that blaze "terrified the world").
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arguments.26° One MP argued that this measure would allow indi-
viduals access to the courts by providing them with the necessary in-
formation to prove their cases.26' This IP, like other MPs, spoke of
the Matrix Churchill scandal, and concluded that had the Bill been in
place, that event might not have occurred.262 Furthermore, an MP
noted that Britain's policy of secrecy made things difficult for the
men and women of the armed forces during the Gulf War.26' This MP
stated that for far too long the Government has hidden behind the de-
fense of national security."
MPs also discussed the fact that other countries look in disbelief at
the way Britain carries out its affairs and how this Bill would help
improve the government's image. 265 Additionally, an MP argued that
260. See 219 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 621 (1993) (statement of Mr. Shep-
herd) [hereinafter Shepherd Comments] (reiterating Blair's arguments for account-
able government and better quality of decisions); 219 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.)
590-91 (1993) (statement of Mr. Bob Cryer) [hereinafter Cryer Comments] (telling
of another fire in Bradford and emphasizing that "[i]t is wrong that our constitu-
ents should be ignorant of potentially lethal dangers in their communities").
261. See 219 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 626-627 (1993) (statement of Mrs.
Barbara Roche) [hereinafter Roche Comments] (detailing the experience of one of
her constituents who was unable to bring a suit against a dye company and a hos-
pital that inserted dye into her, because the hospital was not required by law to re-
lease the ingredients of the dye).
262. See id. (stating that "the documents that might have entered the public do-
main under the Bill would have shown the great lengths to which Whitehall advi-
sors were prepared to go to keep the secret shifts in defense-related trade policy");
Foster Comments, supra note 232, at 618 (stating "many of the Government's dif-
ficulties in relation to Matrix Churchill, the miners' debacle or, more recently, the
problems with the social chapter, might not have occurred had the Bill been in
place").
263. See Roche Comments, supra note 261, at 625 (expressing her dismay over
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and commenting on the role Britain's secrecy played
in this event). In addition, Roche said "The fact that there was that secrecy and
what was clearly happening was an arms trade with Iraq meant that there was no
public debate whatever on the issue and it led to the consequences that resulted."
Id.
264. See id. at 626 (stating that "[f]or far too long, Governments have hidden
behind the defense of national security"); cf 219 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 649
(statement of Ms. Glenda Jackson) [hereinafter Jackson Comments] (noting that
most of Britain's democratic neighbors "find it perfectly possible to protect their
freedom and security without enveloping themselves and their political institutions
in a cloak of impenetrable secrecy").
265. See Roche Comments, supra note 261, at 627 (quoting an article written by
Richard Norton-Taylor which appeared in THE GUARDIAN, in which Britain is de-
scribed as "Ostrich-like"); Hoey Arguments, supra note 3, at 636 (stating that
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most Britons wish to use the act for common "daily matters," not to
obtain information to endanger national security or find fault with the
government.2 MPs received a voluminous amount of postcards from
constituents expressing support for the Bill and detailing how they
would use the act to obtain general information.267 Also, MPs argued
that the Bill was necessary for Britain's democracy to reach adult-
hood.268
According to the MPs who opposed the Bill, however, Britain's
government is doing just fine with its slow piece-meal approach.269
These MPs argued that one of the benefits of having an unwritten
constitution is the ability to target reform and not impart on whole-
sale change.270 Additionally, they advanced the theme of "progres-
sive openness" to demonstrate the extent to which the Government
has already created a more open and informed society.27' The MPs
pointed to the Local Government (Access to Information) Act, 2 the
"[w]e are viewed by many people as being liars and cheats who are prepared to
cover up all manner of things" and "[w]hen there is no right to know and no free-
dom of information, it is difficult to disprove that view").
266. Roche Comments, supra note 261, at 626.
267. See Hoey Arguments, supra note 3, at 636 (stating that "[t]he number of
cards and letters shows that there is broad support for the Bill across the political
party divide"); see also Foster Comments, supra note 232, at 618 (detailing a
MORI poll that showed that "77 percent of the British people favored freedom of
information legislation, and 74 percent of Conservative Voters favored it).
268. See Fisher Arguments, supra note 1, at 595 (noting the need for Britain's
democracy to go from childhood to adulthood, where everyone has "the right to
share the information which is paid for with taxpayers' money and collected in our
name but withheld from us"); see also Rooker Comments, supra note 232, at 608
(describing Britain's machinery of government as archaic and analogizing it in the
operation of secrecy to be "on par with that of the 19th century high-class whore-
house in terms of protection of its clients").
269. See Wheeler Comments, supra note 221, at 614 ("Much of the information
that people need and desire, and which the bill is aimed at, is already publicly
available... There is no doubt that the Government were more open... Those
moves in specific and targeted areas are far more effective than the Bill's blanket
provisions.").
270. See id at 612 (stating the "answer is not wholesale change but targeted re-
form").
271. See id at 613 (stating after responding to a question, "I return to the theme
of progressive openness"); see also Waldegrave Argues, supra note 221 (arguing
that much more information is now available and listing the measures that give
such access).
272. See supra Part II.B.2 (providing a thorough discussion of the Local Gov-
ernment (Access to Information) Act).
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Citizen's Charter,273 the Data Protection Act,274 the Access to Per-
sonal Files Act,2 75 and the Access to Health Records Act276 as evi-
dence of openness.
Paralleling the above argument concerning wholesale change was
the argument that the Official Secrets Act should not be reformed in
the manner in which Fisher envisions because it would be throwing
away "years of practical experience" and putting the Nation "at
risk." 7 7 Alternatively, MPs believed that the correct way to deal with
the secretive culture is to develop it, building on its strengths.278 It
appears, however, that this is what has been done for many years, yet
problems still exist.
279
In addition, MPs argued that freedom of information acts in other
countries have added nothing28° and that the Bill would interfere with
the public's right to privacy.28' As in prior Parliamentary debates,
273. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text (discussing the Citizen's
Charter).
274. See generally INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & THE LAW 22 (Edwards et. al
eds., 1990) [hereinafter IT LAW] (explaining how the Data Protection Act of 1984
introduced into UK law a statutory concept of privacy in relation to computerized
personal information). Under the Act, individuals are entitled to access to personal
data held by users, and are compensated if the data is inadvertently disclosed or
incorrect. See id. Compare id., with, the U.S.'s Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(1994) (regulating the collection, maintaince, use, and dissemination of personal
information by government agencies).
275. See BIRKINSHAW, supra note 9, at 259-263 (detailing the provisions of the
Act and how it provides the public access to manual files which contain their per-
sonal information).
276. See id. at 264-65 (elaborating on the Access to Health Records Act 1990,
which gives access rights to health records). Health records are defined broadly,
covering information relating to the physical or mental health of an individual
made by or on behalf of a health professional in connection with their care. See id.
Health care professionals include dentists, midwives, and nurses. See id.
277. Wheeler Comments, supra note 221, at 612.
278. See id. (stating that he believed that Britain should "reform what already
exists, examine the areas of information already kept confidential and redefine
more of them for the public domain").
279. See supra notes 31, 32 (discussing the Official Secrets Act of 1989).
280. See 219 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 648 (1993) (statement of Mr. Trend)
[hereinafter Trend Comments] (stating "experience from other countries suggests
that freedom of information adds nothing to the political response that one might
achieve by asking a direct question in the legislature").
281. See Waldegrave Argues, supra note 221, at 597 (arguing that "conflicting
interests" must be resolved, in particular, "the right to privacy"). Waldegrade al-
ludes to trade union rights and commercial confidentiality, and claims it is the duty
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MPs expressed concern over the Bill's interference with the principle
of Ministerial Accountability, especially in regard to the appellate
mechanism included in the bill. 2 In light of the above arguments,
this Bill reached the Committee stage but was eventually talked out.
A total of eighty-six amendments were attached to the Bill, ensuring
its defeat.28 3 To Fisher's dismay, most of the amendments were "de-
signed to probe the need for the existence of the commissioner and
the tribunal." 294
The Committee that reviewed the Bill offered a sole Ombudsman
procedure as an alternative mechanism." 5 According to this Com-
mittee, such a mechanism would be more flexible and speedier and
would engender "less of a siege mentality" in those whose attitudes
they seek to alter.2 6 The Committee basically believed that Fisher's
Bill, particularly the review mechanism, would not create the right
climate for enforcement. Since the Bill's "openness" would be man-
datory rather than natural, it would not "foster the right attitude of
openness. '217 Again, MPs argued that if such measures were forced
upon ministers, the candidness of their discussions would decrease
of the government to protect those rights. See id
282. See id at 606 (voicing "one issue of high principle" as being the relation-
ship between Parliament and the Commissioner and the tribunal and recommend-
ing against adopting the Bill's structure or approach); Trend Comments, supra
note 280, at 649-50 (explaining that his "aim would be to find the best way to rec-
oncile the Westminister principle of ministerial accountability to Parliament with
greatly increased public rights of information" but arguing further that "the
piecemeal approach can be just as profound - perhaps more so than the statutory
route").
283. See 227 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 1270 (1993) (statement of Mr. Deputy
Speaker) (announcing to Parliament some of the 86 amendments); see also Nikki
Knewstub, Mfls Angry As Private Members' Bills Succumb to 'Serial Killing,
GUARDIAN, July 3, 1993, at 8 (detailing how Fisher's Bill had completed 15 hours
in committee but was doomed when 90 amendments were tabled by Tory MPs).
284. 227 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 1271 (1993) (statement of Mr. Peter Luff)
[hereinafter Luff Remarks].
285. See id at 1273 (suggesting that "an alternative mechanism would better be
modeled on the ombudsman procedure").
286. See id In addition, Luff asserts:
We should pass legislation only if we believe that it will assist to alter attitudes as well
as the legal framework. If we believe that a particular part of a Bill may have an ad-
verse effect on attitudes and the way in which people conduct themselves, we should
pause and think long and hard before passing legislation. Its enactment may make us
feel better but it may make things worse in the outside world.
Id at 1272.
287. See id at 1273.
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and more secrecy would entail.288
Fisher objected to the sole Ombudsman, stating that he purposely
included a tribunal like that of Australia. He noted that the proposed
Ombudsman structure was more similar to the system used in Can-
ada, which "has a much weaker form of enforcement through its
Commissioner" under its access statute.28 9 He then argued with an
MP over the wording of two new clauses appended to the bill.290
Fisher was outraged because these "new" clauses were identical to
ones that were contained in the original bill.29' Fisher accused the
Government of deliberately wrecking his bill by attaching so many
amendments and conducting such "time-wasting" activities.2'
Moreover, Fisher called attention to the Government's alleged ac-
tions to inform the public about the techniques the Government uses
to kill bills it does not like-particularly bills like his which seek to
take power out of the hands of ministers.293 Fisher relentlessly con-
cluded that it is "very sad and democratically wrong" that private
member bills are defeated not on their merits, but by the Government
attaching so many amendments.294
2. The White Paper on Open Government and The Code of Practice
On Access to Government Information
In July of 1993, the Government presented its White Paper on
288. See id. (asserting that MPs might rely on nods and winks instead of spoken,
and therefore transcribed, words).
289. 227 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 1282 (1993) (statement of Mark Fisher)
[hereinafter Fisher at Tabling]. In addition, Fisher argues, based on his years in
government, that the ability of the Ombudsmen to "deliver decisions that are con-
strained by the rules and criteria under which they must work, is not great .... If
we leave enforcement.., to an ombudsman and not to a tribunal or commissioner
that enforcement will take 6 months, 9 months .... ." Id. The tribunal and Com-
missioner can function more quickly and "sometimes the speed and accessibility
of information ... is as important as the information itself." Id.
290. See generally 227 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 1275-80 (1993).
291. See Fisher at Tabling, supra note 289, at 1275 (observing that the wording
of the new clause was virtually identical to that of clause 57).
292. See id at 1284.
293. See id. at 1276 (stating that "[I]t is no mystery to Members of Parliament.
. what goes on here when private Member's Bills are debated, but it is important
for the public to understand the actions of this House").
294. See id. at 1283.
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"Open Government" to Parliament. 95 The Paper begins by stating,
"Open government is part of an effective democracy." 296 The Paper
is then broken down into nine chapters detailing the government's
record, providing reasons for confidentiality, advocating and de-
scribing a code of practice on government information, and propos-
ing two new statutory rights of access to personal records and health
and safety records.297 Included in the appendix is a Draft Code of
Practice on Government Information.298
When the government released the Paper, many were not pleased
with the recommendation for a Code over statutory rights of ac-
cess.299 Senior civil servants even privately agreed that the White Pa-
per was a weak document allowing ministers a wide measure of dis-
cretion."' One critic thought that the Paper presented a paradox.3'
"If statutory rights of access really undermine ministerial account-
ability, why has the government accepted them in two important ar-
eas?" 302
In April of 1994, the Code of Practice outlined in the White Paper
took effect.30 3 The Code of Practice contains five main governmental
commitments. Individual departments are directed to comply with
these commitments while responding to requests within twenty
295. See OPEN GOVERNIMENT, 1993, Cmnd. 2290 [hereinafter White Paper].
296. See id at 1.
297. See id
298. See id at 72 (Annex A).
299. See Stephen Alderman, Minister Hails Move to More Open Government,
PRESS Ass'N NEWSFILE, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File (re-
porting how on the day of the unveiling, Marjorie Mowlam, a Labor MP, stated
that there "had been a deep failure" to deliver an open government). But cf
PYPER, supra note 18, at 159 (reasoning that although the White Paper may not
have represented "open government" when measured against the standards of the
United States, it was a "progressive measure" by British standards).
300. See Norton-Taylor, supra note 231, at 21 (detailing senior civil servants
views on the Government's White Paper on Open Government).
301. See Maurice Frankel, Freedom to Know, TIMES (London), Aug. 2, 1993,
available in 1993 WL10594180.
302. See id The areas to which Frankel referred were the people's right of ac-
cess to personal files and to health and safety information. See id He argued that if
access to this type of information would not undermine ministerial accountability,
access to other types of information would not undermine it either. See id
303. See PYPER, supra note 18, at 159 (providing April 1994 as the time in
which the Code of Practice on Government Information, outlined in the White Pa-
per, "came into force").
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days.3 Under the Code, a great deal of information should also "be
provided free of charge." 305
Fifteen categories of information are exempt from disclosure un-
der the Code.0 6 If an individual has a complaint, he or she must first
contact the body that refused the information for an internal re-
view." 7 The next step would be to approach a Member of Parliament
who will bring the case to the Parliamentary Commissioner for Ad-
ministration, also called the Ombudsman.30 8 The Ombudsman is an
independent officer of Parliament who has the power to see the
documents and the duty to inform Parliament when government
304. See Code, supra note 225, Part I § 3.5 (listing the five code commitments,
to supply facts and analysis with major policy decisions, to open up internal
guidelines about departments' dealings, to give reasons for administrative deci-
sions, to provide information under the Citizen's Charter about public services;
and to respond to requests for information).
305. See Code Guide, supra note 225. Information will especially be provided
free of charge under certain circumstances:
Where it is necessary to explain: benefits, grants, and entitlements; the standards and
performances of services; the reasons for administrative decisions . . . the way in
which you may exercise your rights to appeal or regulatory requirements bearing on
your business.
Id
However, "to ensure that the Code does not create extra burdens on the tax-
payer, there may be a charge if the information does not come within one of these
categories." Id. The costs vary by department, so one must contact the appropriate
department to find out if there will be a charge for a given request. See id.
306. See Code, supra note 225, Part II (including the following as exemptions:
defense, security, and international relations, internal discussion and advice, com-
munications with the Royal Household, law enforcement and legal proceedings,
immigration and nationality, effective management of the economy and tax col-
lection, effective management and operations of the public service, public em-
ployment, public appointments and honors, voluminous or vexatious requests,
publication and prematurity, research, statistics and analysis, privacy of individual,
third parties' commercial confidences, information given in confidence, and
statutory and other restrictions).
307. See id. Part I, § 11. See generally Tom Riley, News From Canada and
Abroad, 21 ACCESs REPORTS, Apr. 12, 1995, at 8 (noting that the internal review
process can be conducted under the Code prior to a complaint going to the Com-
missioner). In addition, Riley provides a summary of the Internal Review Process
after one year of the Code. See id. The summary is as follows: "The most oft-cited
exceptions quoted were: exemption 2 (internal discussion and advice); exemption
7 (effective management and operation of the public service); exemption 13 (third
party's commercial confidence); and exemption 14 (information given in confi-
dence)." Id.
308. See Code Guide, supra note 225 (explaining the complaint procedure).
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agencies and departments are violating the code.3 Final decisions
rest with the Ombudsman, who determines whether the departments
were justified in refusing to release the documents and the informa-
tion contained therein. The Ombudsman, however, can only make
recommendations; he or she cannot order disclosure."'
Since the implementation of the Code, many have complained
about the high fees charged for information and their deterrent ef-
fect."' In addition, individuals have complained that one does not re-
309. See id (explaining the Ombudsman's powers). In 1994, the Parliamentary
Commissioner for Administration received twenty-eight complaints. See Riley,
supra note 307, at 8 (reporting on the Parliamentary Commissioner's activities
from the Code's beginning to the date of this source's publication). As of April
1995, the Commissioner had issued five reports and completed six investigations.
See id Out of the twenty-eight complaints, seven were ruled out of his jurisdiction.
See id Mr. Riley includes in his reports the results of the first three investigations
reported to Parliament by the Commissioner. See id They are as follows:
(i) Two complaints that the Department of Transport had refused to give details of the
Inspector's report on the inquiry into the proposed Birmingham Northern Relief Road
scheme in 1988. These complaints were upheld, and the Ombudsman recommended
release of the Inspector's report;
(ii) A complaint that the Valuation Office Agency had refused to reveal the identity of
a house purchaser. The Complaint was dismissed, on the grounds that the release of
the information would breach the purchasor's personal privacy; and
(iii) A complaint that the Department of Health had refused to give details of contacts
with the pharmaceutical industry. The complaint was upheld in part, but the Ombuds-
man accepted that the identities of representatives involved in the discussions coukd be
legitimately withheld. The Department agreed to give further information about the
dates of contacts and the form they had taken.
Id
310. See Tom Riley, News From Canada and Abroad, 19 ACCESS REPORTS
Aug. 4, 1993, at 11 (noting that the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administra-
tion has only recommendation powers and stating that "experience in other coun-
tries has shown that a Commissioner solely with recommendation powers experi-
ences many problems in convincing officials to release information").
311. See Cal McCrystal, Freedom Fighter Amid the In-trays; Right to Know
Comes at a Price, INDEP., Nov. 13, 1994, at I 1 (reporting on the Campaign for
Freedom of Information's report that showed that high fees charged under the
Code were often a deterrent to the use of the Code); Peter Victor, Freedom of In-
formation: It Will Cost You; The Facts We Need To Know Have Turned Into 'Gov-
ernment-Held Tradable Information.' INDEP., June 18, 1995, at 4 (providing ex-
amples of large fees certain agencies had charged for general information,
sometimes as much as £2,000 or £3,000). The Meteorological Office, for example,
has charged exorbitant fees for weather information. See id Victor worries that
"many people who ask questions under the code are intimidated by the threat of
charges." Id Specifically, Victor reported that in 1994, 9 out of 90 people who
asked the Inland Review for information under the Code dropped their requests
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ceive the actual "pre-existing" documents, but rather "access to in-
formation."3 12 This policy allows the Government to publish infor-
mation in a manner which it finds appealing, frustrating the very
purpose of freedom of information.3"3 Another significant problem is
the fact that citizens often do not know what information is available,
nor do they fully understand the role of the Ombudsman.314 In fact,
most individuals are not aware of the Code's existence due to sparse
advertising by the Government.3 " The Government recently con-
ceded this point and has increased its efforts to educate the public
about the Code.316
Press releases issued by the Cabinet Office highlight the positive
effects that the Code is having in Britain.317 Yet, the campaign for
freedom of information legislation continues, and Select Commit-
when they were told how much the requests would cost. See id
312. See Riley, supra note 307, at 12 (relating the Campaign for Freedom of In-
formation's poor marks for the Code's first year in practice and citing the "thorny
problem that the Code does not require release of the actual documents containing
the information, but only the information itself'). Riley does state that this weak-
ness has not gone unnoticed by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administra-
tive Complaints, "who in his first case, commented on how onerous and mislead-
ing this was and that, in fact, it would be better if the document itself were
released". Id; see also Code, supra note 225, Part I, § 5 (describing access to in-
formation).
313. See BIRKNSHAW, supra note 9, at 202 (explaining that under the code
"there would be access to information which would be selected, filleted and pre-
sented by officials").
314. J. Ross Harper, Open Season on the Protection of Privacy, SCOTSMAN, July
13, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, TXTNWS File.
315. See Stephen Ward, Code of Openness Fails To Catch the Public Imagina-
tion, INDEP., Mar. 15, 1995, at 4 (reporting that official government figures con-
firmed expectations that few people used the open government code in its first
year, possibly because there is little public awareness of its existence).
316. See Cabinet Office (OPS) Press Office, Improving Access To Government
Information, Jan. 17, 1996 (visited July 18, 1997) <http://www.open.gov.uk/
coi/ops/5/96.html> (explaining how the Home Office is circulating over 30,000
copies of a new leaflet explaining the Code as a part of "an ongoing campaign
aimed at raising people's awareness... ").
317. See Cabinet Office (OPS) Press Office, Freeman Welcomes Open Govern-
ment Momentum: 17,000 More Records Released Since May, Oct. 23, 1995 (vis-
ited July 18, 1997) <http://www.open.gov.uk/coi/ops/264/95.html> (relating the
increase in amounts of records released under the Code along with a statement by
Roger Freeman, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, that "release of these
files is a further step in our programme to make government more accessible to the
public").
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tees,3 18 and Blair, 19 are calling for the implementation of such legis-
lation.
In sum, the concept of freedom of information has gained support
from current members of Parliament. The idea of freedom of infor-
mation legislation went from being strongly criticized in 1970, with
concerns over high costs and administrative burdens, to being widely
accepted by the time Freud introduced his Official Information Bill
in 1980.320 These ten years are important because they demonstrate
the government's hold on Parliament's agenda. Had the Labour Party
not lost the election in 1979, Britain might have a freedom of infor-
mation act today. 2
From 1980-1990 one sees further evidence of the government's
power over Parliament in the area of freedom of information. Steel's
bill died even with multiparty support.3 ' Although one saw freedom
of information enacted on the local level, it happened because the
government wanted it for economic reasons-not freedom of infor-
mation reasons.3"
Over the past few years, while the British government has done
more to open government, the government remains largely closed.324
318. See British MPs Urge Freedom of Information Act, REUTERS, Mar. 27,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File (reporting that the Select
Committee on the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration stated that
"[w]e recommend that the government introduce a Freedom of Information Act").
319. See New Labour, supra note I1 (demonstrating Blair's commitment to
FOD.
320. See supra Part II.A.2 (providing an overview of Parliament's response to
freedom of information legislation since the 1970s).
321. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing the death of Freud's
Bill with the fall of the Labour Government).
322. See supra notes 176 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that Steel's
Bill died even though it had the support of the Labour, Social Democratic, and
Liberal Parties).
323. Concern on the part of conservative councillors about profligate spending
by local constituencies led Prime Minister Thatcher to support local freedom of
information acts without endorsing a national one. See Squire States, supra note
182, at 520 (noting Thatcher's general concerns about local inefficiency and hop-
ing that greater scrutiny of expenditure would lead to less local spending).
324. See supra notes 2-4 (citing examples of" secrets," such as the length of the
queue at the post office); see also supra note 316 (discussing Government realiza-
tion of and efforts to increase public awareness of that information to which they
actually have access); Putting the Case For A Freedom of Information Act,
SCOTSMAN, Mar. 8, 1996, at 14 (arguing that the Code "falls short of a Freedom of
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Mark Fisher was not able to break down the walls of secrecy, so a
new champion is needed."' Blair is already one step ahead of Fisher
given his position as Prime Minister. If Blair wishes to see a freedom
of information act implemented, he must address the main issues that
arose in the Parliamentary debates discussed above, issues specific to
Britain, rather than relying solely on the access statutes of other
countries.32 Those main issues are: Ministerial Accountability, pro-
gram costs, administrative burden, confidentiality, and protection of
cabinet confidences.
III. ACCESS STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES,
CANADA, AND AUSTRALIA
Although some MPs refuse to look to other countries' Acts as
prototypes for Britain, other MPs have recognized the value of these
countries' experiences.3 2 ' Accordingly, this section outlines the free-
dom of information statutes of the United States, Australia, and Can-
ada in order to formulate an appropriate statute for Blair.
The United States has the oldest statute, enacted in 1966.328 The
statute, entitled the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),329 provides
access to all persons, even the British, and is liberally construed in
favor of disclosure. 330 President Clinton33' and Janet Reno, 332 the At-
Information Act" because it only promises "information," not the actual docu-
ments, and because it is not enforceable in the courts).
325. See Leader, supra note 14, at 22 (describing Marc Fisher's Right to Know
Bill).
326. See supra notes 107-08, 270, 280 and accompanying text (detailing MPs
preferences to disregard the experiences of other countries under their access stat-
utes).
327. See supra notes 107, 236 (providing MPs arguments that parliament should
look to the United States, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand for guidance on
freedom of information).
328. See supra note 5 (detailing the date of enactment of the United States'
Freedom of Information Act).
329. 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended by Electronic Freedom of Information Act
Amendments of 1996, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West Supp. 1997).
330. See Bristol-Meyers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (reiterating
that the legislative plan for the FOIA creates a liberal disclosure requirement).
331. See President's Memorandum for Heads of Departments and Agencies Re-
garding the Freedom of Information Act, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1999
(Oct. 4, 1993), reprinted in FOIA UPDATE (DOJ/Office of Information and Pri-
vacy, D.C.), Summer/Fall 1993, at 3 (calling upon federal agencies to renew their
commitment to the Act). President Clinton stated:
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tomey General of the United States, recently reiterated this pro-
disclosure attitude. In Canada, as well, the Information Commis-
sioner called for a more pro-disclosure attitude among government
departments.333 Liberals enacted the Canadian Access to Information
Act (AIA)334 in 1982 as a result of strong pressure from the Conser-
vative opposition party.335 Parliament hotly debated the statute due to
For more than a century now, the Freedom of Information Act has played a unique
role in strengthening our democratic form of government. The statute was enacted
based upon the fundamental principle that an informed citizenry is essential to the
democratic process and that the more the American people know about their govern-
ment the better they will be governed. Openness in government is essential to account-
ability and the Act has become an integral part of that process.
Id
332. See Attorney General Reiterates FOIA Policy, FOIA UPDATE (DOJ/Office
of Information and Privacy, D.C.), Spring 1997, at I (detailing how Reno redis-
tributed a memo that was issued by her and President Clinton in 1993 pertaining to
the importance of the FOIA with the direction that they be given to recent appoint-
ees). The 1997 memorandum, which accompanied and detailed the 1993 memo,
stated in pertinent part, "I urge you to be sure to continue our strong commitment
to the openness-in-government principles .... These principles include ... ap-
plying a presumption of disclosure in FOIA decision making." Id
333. See NOTES FOR AN ADDRESS TO THE CANADIAN ACCESS AND PRIVACY
ASSOCIATION, (last visited July 20, 1997) <http://fox.nsm.cai--smulloylcapa-
eng.html> [hereinafter NOTES] (asking members of the Canadian Access and Pri-
vacy association to remember that "attitudes towards access cannot be legislated..
. The beginning of reform is a will to make this law work" and that will not be
accomplished by "offer[ing] more opportunity to insulate records from the right of
access"); cf INFO. COMM'R OF CAN., ANNUAL REPORT INFORMATION
COMMISSIONER 1995-1996 (1996) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 1995-96] (deny-
ing the principle that "everything is secret unless specifically stated otherwise,"
the Information Commissioner of Canada states that "the truth is precisely the op-
posite"). Furthermore, he states:
The onus is plainly upon the government to demonstrate why a record cannot be re-
leased, either in whole or in part. Individuals do not have to prove their case for the
release of government-held information any more than they need to say why they want
the information. Unless the government can demonstrate before an information com-
missioner or a court a right to withhold a record, it must be released. That's the law.
The assumption of this remarkable law is that information belongs to the people. In the
British system, that's revolutionary.
Id
334. See Access to Information Act, RtS.C., ch. 111 (1980-1983) [hereinafter
AIA].
335. See Anthony Johnson, The Frustrating Hunt for Information, OTTAWA
CrrIZEN, July 3, 1993, at B4 (reporting that Canada's statute was passed in 1983
by Liberals but that "[i]ironically, it was the opposition Conservatives who pushed
the hardest for freedom of information legislation and were harshly critical of the
Act's cabinet secrecy provisions").
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Canada's Westminister style of government and concerns over Min-
isterial Accountability. 336 Reports from Canada's Information Com-
missioner, who is appointed by Parliament, indicate that the Act has
proven extremely powerful and effective 337 and that it is able to stand
alongside Canada's Official Secrets Act.338
Australia, like Canada and Britain, operates under a Westminister
336. See 21 PARE. DEB., H.C. 6725 (1980) (statement of Mr. Fox) (thanking all
of the members who participated in the debate and stating: "we have given a great
deal of thought to reasonable proposals in the area of ministerial responsibility").
Furthermore, Fox stated, "The government decided to take the route of judicial
review .... However, we felt that there was a possible conflict between the prin-
ciple of ministerial accountability and the principle of judicial review." Id.; see
also INFO. COMM'R OF CAN., THE ACCESs TO INFORMATION AcT: 10 YEARS ON
(1994) [hereinafter 10 YEARS] (emphasizing that Canada has inherited parliamen-
tary sovereignty and that government tradition holds each minister responsible for
the actions of his or her department and therefore, "broad access, it was feared,
could dilute that responsibility and make ministers less accountable to the pub-
lic"). Furthermore, "[t]his subtle, yet important, difference [to America] has
deeply shaded the discussion of information in this country." Id.
337. See ANNUAL REPORT 1995-96, supra note 333, at 5 ("Each and every day,
in newspapers, on radio and television, we see and hear the power and effective-
ness of the access law."). For example, Canada learned about golf trips to Florida
for military generals, contracting practices at Natural Resources Canada, and a ten
percent pay increase to the Deputy Governors of the Bank of Canada. See id.; see
also 10 YEARS, supra note 336, at 23 (conceding that "no one expected that the
most restrictive elements of parliamentary sovereignty and ministerial secrecy
would be overturned in a decade").
338. See Official Secrets Act, R.S.C., ch. 0-3, § (1985). Chapter 0-5, section 3,
"Offenses" reads as follows:
3. 1) Every person who is guilty of an offence under this Act, who, for any purpose
prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, (a) approaches, inspects, passes over,
is in the neighbourhood of or enters any prohibited place; (b) makes any sketch, plan,
model or note that is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indi-
rectly useful to a foreign power; or (c) obtains, collects, records or publishes, or com-
municates to any other person, any secret official code word, password, sketch, plan,
model, article, note, document or information that is calculated to be or might be or is
intended to be directly or indirectly useful to a foreign power.
Id. at ch. 0-5, § 3. This statute, unlike Britain's Official Secrets Act, relates to es-
pionage only. The statute is also rarely used. See Reform, supra note 66 (discuss-
ing how Canada has an Official Secrets Act "but has given up using it"). In addi-
tion, other countries have similar legislation but do not use it. See id. For example,
Australia has similar provisions in its Commonwealth Crimes Act 1914 but never
uses it. See id. The United States confines itself to "legislation that protects clearly
identified national secrets such as the National Defense Act 1911, the Espionage
Act 1917, and the Comint Act 1950." Id.
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style of govemment. 3 9 Concern as to whether the United States
FOIA could be implemented in Australia, as a result of the countries'
dissimilar constitutional and administrative firameworks, permeated
the enactment of Australia's Freedom of Information (FOI) Act.30
Today, Australia's Act is lauded as playing an important role in
Australia's democratic system and increasing the accountability of
officials."I Yet, as in other countries, calls for change in agency cul-
339. See PATRICK WELLER, Introduction to MENZIES TO KEATING: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUSTRIAN PRIME MINISTERSHIP 1 (1993) ("The language
of the Westminister system, however poorly that concept defines the workings of
the political system, remains intact.").
340. See generally ISSUES PAPER, supra note 7, at 4-7 (providing the back-
ground to the introduction of the FOI Act). In 1974, the first of two Interdepart-
mental Committees formed to examine freedom of information concluded that
"should the Government decide to enact FOI legislation, it would be necessary to
modify the United States legislation to take account of Australia's constitutional
and administrative structure." Id at 4. Specifically, the Committee recommended
that certain exemptions be included and that conclusive certificates exist. See id
Following this report, the Interdepartmental Committee Report of 1976 main-
tained that "a person should have a legally enforceable right of access to any
document in the possession of a department" and that such a right is essential for
and complimentary to Australia's democratic government. See id at 5. The Com-
mittee stated as follows:
The basic premise from which consideration of the issue in Australia must begin is that
in a parliamentary democracy the Executive Government is accountable to the Parlia-
ment and through the Parliament to the people. An informed electorate is able to exer-
cise a more informed choice at the ballot box. But, more than that, openness of access
to information, in the words of the Royal Commission on Australian Government Ad-
ministration, 'promotes an aware and participatory democracy.'
Id
341. See AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COM'N, DISCUSSION PAPER 59, FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION (1995) at 9 [hereinafter DISCUSSION PAPER] (stating that the Law
Reform Commission considers that the "Act has had a marked impact on the way
agencies make decisions and the way agencies ... record information"). Further-
more, the Commission reported that:
[Tihe FOI Act has focused decision-makers' minds on the need to base decisions on
relevant factors. The knowledge that decisions and processes are subject to scrutiny..
. imposes a constant discipline on the bureaucracy. The openness guaranteed by the
FOI Act has improved the accountability of government.
Id
They also noted that public servants' accountability to Ministers is compli-
mented by the fact that their decisions are open to public scrutiny. See id; cf Rob-
ert Richards, The Freedom of Information Act, AUSTRALIAN ACCT., May 1995,
available in, LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File (advocating the use of the FOI
Act for information from the Tax office, as a means of obtaining information). But
see G. TERILL, SUBMISSION 17 ("In some ways the Act actually undermines efforts
towards increased openness. The seriousness with which it is taken by government
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ture are prevalent.342 The Australian Law Reform Commission
(ALRC)3 43 recommended that the Act be amended to contain a pre-
amble, which would make clear that access to government informa-
tion is a right, and, most importantly, that the Act has its origins in
the present understanding of the Constitution and Australia's form of
democracy. 344
British MPs are correct that attitudes towards openness are diffi-
cult to legislate. Experiences in these countries, however, demon-
strate that the statutes have played a crucial role in positively chang-
ing the mechanics of government.3 45 This section explores those
experiences in detail, focusing on the issues raised in Britain's de-
bates over freedom of information.
A. FORMS OF ACCESS
Unlike Britain, Australia, Canada, and the United States provide
individuals with actual physical documents.346 Canadians have the
broad legal right to information recorded in any form and controlled
by most federal government institutions. 347 Recent publications re-
... is often used to suggest that openness is a rule; this is not so. There are innu-
merable other ways to achieve openness.")
342. See, e.g., DIscussIoN PAPER, supra note 341, at 11 (concluding upon a
study of the FOI Act that "the culture of some agencies is not supportive of the
philosophy of open government and FOI" and recommending that agencies
change this culture through the use of training sessions inculcating the importance
of the Act).
343. See ISSUES PAPER, supra note 7, at viii (providing a copy of the Acting
Attorney General's Order to the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) to
conduct an inquiry and report under the Law Reform Commission Act 1973, Sec-
tion 6 on whether the basic purposes and principles of the freedom of information
legislation in Australia have been satisfied and whether they require modification).
The ARLC was also instructed to conduct this inquiry with the Administrative Re-
view Council (ARC). See id. at 1.
344. See DIscussIoN PAPER, supra note 341, at 13 (recommending that the FOI
Act be amended to include a preamble and delineating what that preamble should
include).
345. See id. at 9 (" [T]he review considers that the Act has had a marked impact
on the way agencies make decisions and the way they record information.").
346. See supra note 312 (explaining that the current Code of Practice on Access
to Government Information does not require the release of actual documents).
347. See AIA, supra note 334, § 3 (defining record)
"Record" includes any correspondence, memorandum, book, plan, map, drawing, dia-
gram, pictorial, or graphic work, photograph, film, microform sound recording video-
tape, machine readable record, and any other documentary material, regardless of
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leased by Canada's Information Commissioner, however, illustrate
the need to reform the Act to reflect changes that have occurred in
the infiastrcture of information technology. 8
In Australia, individuals have access to "documents."3 9 The con-
cept of document is very broad, as in Canada, and "has served the
Act well to date." A shift to the concept of information is being re-
quested, however, in addition to provisions to bring the Act in line
with new technology.35 °
physical form or characteristics, and any copy thereof.
Id; see also ANNUAL REPORT 1995-96, supra note 333, at I (describing Cana-
dian's rights under the AIA).
348. See INFO. COMM'R OF CAN., ANNUAL REPORT INFORNMATION
COMMISSIONER 1994-1995, (1995) at 3-5 [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 1994-95]
(discussing the information superhighway, the Information Commissioner stated
that "[p]raise it or doubt it, this tantalizing and powerful image cannot be ignored
by gatherers and custodians of information or by those with legislative . . . or
statutory... responsibility towards a law called the 'Access to Information Act'");
Minister of Public Works and Government Services, Information Technology and
Open Government (visited July 23, 1997) <http://infoweb.magi.comI
-accessca/ogov-e.html> (assessing the impact of new information technologies
and new information management practices on open government and the princi-
ples and application of the Access to Information Act). This report was prepared
for the Information Commissioner of Canada by Information Management & Eco-
nomics, Inc. of Toronto. See id; see also INFO. COMNM'R OF CAN., ANNUAL REPORT
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER 1993-1994, (1994) at 5-9 [hereinafter ANNUAL
REPORT 1993-94] (making the case for reform by highlighting that "ten years ago
government records were primarily paper records" and that this is rapidly chang-
ing and thus, the "access law has some catching up to do if our access rights are to
remain vibrant into the next century"). See generally Tom Riley, News From Can-
ada and Abroad 20 AccEss REPORTS, Dec., 7, 1994 (describing the climate of
change in Canada pertaining to their access to information act and information
technology).
349. See Freedom of Information Act, 1982, ch. 3 § 4 (Cth) [hereinafter FOI]
(defining document). "Document" includes:
(a) any of, or any part of any of, the following things: (i) any paper or other material
on which there is writing, (ii) a map, plan, drawing or photograph; (iii) any paper or
other material on which there are marks, figures, symbols or perforations having a
meaning for persons qualified to interpret them; (iv) any article or material from
which sounds, images or writings are capable of being reproduced with or without the
aid of any other article or device; (v) any article on which information has been stored
or recorded, either mechanically or electronically; (vi) any other record or informa-
tion; or (b) any copy, reproduction or duplicate of such a thing; or (c) any part of such
a copy, reproduction duplicate; but does not include: (d) library material maintained
for reference purposes; or (e) Cabinet notebooks.
Id
350. See DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 34 1, at 3 1; ISSUES PAPER, supra note 7,
at 29 (emphasizing that under the act, agencies are under no obligation to create a
AM. U. INT'L L. RE [
The United States recently amended its FOIA to address the sub-
ject of electronic records, thus expanding the definition of agency
"records" that must be made available to the public.35' Such reforms
were introduced in order to correct lengthy processing delays and ful-
fill FOIA's mandate of providing all "agency records." '352 The find-
ing, releasing, and disseminating of records should now be much
easier. Blair has already contemplated and addressed reforms of Brit-
ain's information technology in the Labour manifesto, linking such
reforms to freedom of information legislation.353
B. FEES AND COSTS
Under all three statutes, access to information is subject to fees
and charges. The costs have often been criticized as contrary to the
document from information in the possession of an agency in order to satisfy a re-
quest).
351. See FOJA UPDATE supra note 5, at 3-9 (providing the text of the Freedom
of Information Act as amended, including the new definition of agency records).
Section (a)(2)(D) "create[s] a new category of records that will be required to re-
ceive 'reading-room treatment'- a category consisting of any records processed
and disclosed in response to a FOIA request that 'the agency determines have be-
come or are likely to become the subject of subsequent requests."' Id. at 1. In
short, if an agency receives a number of requests for a certain type of information,
under this provision, they will have to make it available via electronic reading
rooms. Cf Is FOIA About Records or Information, ACCESS REPORTS, Apr. 16,
1997, at 3 (grappling with the new EFOIA amendments and questioning whether
the FOIA is concerned with records or information). Moreover, he states that
twenty years ago the world of FOIA was "beginning to move from 'record' to 'in-
formation.' From a legal and policy standpoint, the words had begun to be used
interchangeably with no particular awareness that the legal distinctions might be-
come important at some time." Id
352. See Michael Tankersly, Opening Drawers: A Requestors Guide to the
Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments, LEGAL TIMES, May 19, 1997,
at 29-30 (describing how agencies resisted the application of FOIA to electronic
data and violated the FOIA's promise of a "prompt release of records"); Jamie A.
Gordsky, The Freedom of Information Act in the Electronic Age: The Statute is not
User Friendly, 31 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1990) (exploring the conceptual and practical
problems in applying the unamended Freedom of Information Act to computerized
government information); Nancy Ferris, Virtual Records, GOV'T EXEcUTIvE, Aug.
1997, at 43 ("EFOIA . . .will force agencies to use contemporary technology,
while it prods them to cut their backlogs."). The EFOIA amendments extends the
amount of days that an agency has to respond from 10 to 20. See id,
353. See New Labour, supra note 11, at Information Superhighway,
<http://www.labour.org.uk/views/info-highway/social.html> (stating that "the in-
formation society can help make our society more open and accessible").
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aims of the Acts.354 All three countries, however, realize the necessity
of having requesters contribute financially in order to keep adminis-
trative costs to a minimum.3" Both the Information Commissioner
for Canada and the ALRC have asserted that the number of requests
per year is lower than initially predicted and that the law is not ex-
356pensive. Experience in Australia highlights the fact that staff costs
are the main expense; however, it attributes these costs to the absence
of a sole independent monitor of the program.357 Recent proposals
suggest an independent monitor to oversee the administration of the
Act or a Parliamentary Committee.35
All three countries charge for search and retrieval, inspection and
photocopying, and decision making, subject to fee waivers." 9 In ad-
354. See DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 341, at 82 (shaping the issues in regard
to costs).
355. See id. (noting that requestors must be responsible financially); OFFICE OF
THE INFO. COMM'R OF CAN., THE ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT: A CRITICAL
REVIEW 51 (1994) [hereinafter CRITICAL REVIEW] (stating that "anyone seeking
information for the purpose of holding the government accountable or for their
own personal interest should pay minimal fees for obtaining the information").
356. Compare ISSUES PAPER, supra note 7, at 9 (stating that "unlike the Austra-
lian FOI Act, the Act is used by a large number of professional brokers" in the
United States), with NOTES, supra note 333 (scolding the Prime Minister Chretien
for being misinformed and misstating that "every day hundreds and even thou-
sands of information requests are made by journalists, academics and members of
Parliament"). The Information Commissioner stated, "[T]he exaggeration here is
so patent as to require no rebuttal." Id In addition, he stated that in his view,
"much of the complaining about the excessive cost of administering the access law
is without foundation." Id; see also ANNUAL REPORT 1995-96, supra note 333, at
5 (stating "[tiake note ye skeptics who say the right to know is costing the tax-
payer too much" and detailing examples of where money has been saved in Can-
ada under the Act).
357. See ISSUES PAPER, supra note 7, § 9.7 (noting that non-staff costs, for such
things as photocopying, printing, legal fees and computer time, represent less than
ten percent of total costs).
358. See generally DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 341, at 20-30 (recommending
an independent person to oversee the administration of the FOI act and providing a
number of options as to who should perform the role of independent monitor, in-
cluding a parliamentary committee; quasi autonomous unit within the Attorney
General's Department; Ombudsman; Australian Archives; AAT; Privacy Commis-
sioner, and Chief Government Information Officer). The Commission believes,
however, that given the nature of Parliamentary Committees, it is unlikely that a
committee would be able to provide the constant review that is necessary and envi-
sioned by the Review. See id
359. See U.S. Dep't of Justice & U.S. General Services Administration, Your
Right To Federal Records: Questions and Answers on the Freedom of Information
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dition, both Canada 6 ° and Australia36' charge an additional applica-
tion fee for requests. On top of these fees, Australia levies a charge
for review of adverse decisions. 62 Current review of the fee system
in Australia has resulted in a recommendation that the fees remain
the same. 63 In Canada, however, pressure continues to decrease
costs, or at least prevent further increases, because of the deterrent
effect of the fees. 3' A report of the costs associated with the AIA re-
cently suggested other opportunities to reduce the Act's administra-
tive costs, including the reduction of exemptions available, im-
provement in records management, and the streamlining of internal
review and approval procedures. 365 All of these alternatives displace
Act, Dec. 1996, 3 [hereinafter Federal Records] (detailing the cost of obtaining
information for United States citizens who are non-commercial requestors). In the
United States, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, Gov-
ernment agencies assess fees based upon the type of requestor. See generally
FOIA GUIDE, supra note 5, at 391 (stating "[a]s amended by the Freedom of In-
formation Reform Act of 1986, the FOIA provides for three levels of fees that may
be assessed in response to FOIA requests according to categories of FOIA request-
ors"). The Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986 also placed the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) in charge of establishing a uniform fee schedule
and guidelines for individual government agencies as to the fees that requestors are
required to pay. See id. at 390. Accordingly, individuals should consult the OMB
Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. 10,011 (1987). In general, in the United States,
search fees usually range from ten to thirty dollars per hour. See Federal Records,
supra, at 3. The charge for copying may be as low as ten cents per page, but could
be higher depending on the agency. See id. The first 100 copies are free and two
hours of search are free. See id; 10 YEARS, supra note 336, at 21 (stating that in
Canada, "Everyone pays a five dollar application fee which pays for hours of
search time. Thereafter charges for searches, photocopies or computer time can be
applied."); ISSUES PAPER, supra note 7, § 9.2 (charging Australians thirty dollars
for an initial application fee and for photocopying and search time with rates
varying by agency).
360. See NOTES, supra note 333, at 4 (noting that Canada imposes a five dollar
fee per request).
361. See ISSUES PAPER, supra note 7, § 9.2 (noting that an initial request in
Australia costs thirty dollars).
362. See id. (noting that Australia charges forty dollars for an internal review
application).
363. See generally, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 341, at 90 (rejecting the need
to change the fee system and rephrasing the issue in terms of the need to reduce
the costs of providing information, offering improved technology as the means).
364. See NOTES, supra note 333, at 4 (arguing that no reform is better than any
increase in rates).
365. See TREASURY BD. OF CAN., MANAGING BETTER: REVIEW OF THE COSTS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ATIP LEGISLATION [hereinafter
MANAGING BETTER] (advocating that agencies actively work to make information
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the costs from requesters.3" Blair must decide who should bear the
costs-the requester, the taxpayer, or the government.6
C. REVIEW MECHANISMS
If a United States government agency denies a request, an individ-
ual need only send a letter to that agency requesting a review.3  If
the agency denies the appeal, the matter can be taken to a federal
court for de novo review.369 United States courts have the power to
review documents, compel agency disclosure, and/or affirm the
agency's withholding of information.37
Unlike the United States, there is no internal departmental review
in Canada.71 Upon denial of a request the individual appeals to an
independent Parliamentary Ombudsman called the Information
Commissioner.3" The Commissioner has the power to investigate
available to the public domain, introduce "integrity controls" to ensure that infor-
mation is accurately reported, and change how exemptions are applied). Specifi-
cally, it is argued that agencies use an "injury test" to determine if exemptions ap-
ply, in order to provide for a more efficient and inherently less confrontational
review process. See id at 23.
366. See id at 20 (noting that these reforms could reduce costs to the govern-
ment without imposing higher fees on requestors).
367. Compare NOTES, supra note 333 (arguing that requestors should not be re-
quired to pay higher fees because costs to the government are not high, but in fact
are exaggerated by opponents of open government) with MANAGING BETTER, su-
pra note 365 (stating that both requestors and the government alike could benefit
from reduced costs if government procedures were streamlined).
368. See Federal Records, supra note 359, at 5 (directing persons on how to ap-
peal a FOIA decision).
369. See id ("You can file a FOIA lawsuit in the U.S. District Court where you
live, where you have your principal place of business, where the documents are
kept, or in the District of Columbia.").
370. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(B) (1994) (" The court shall determine the matter
de novo, and may examine the contents of such agency records in camera..
371. See ANNUAL REPORT 1995-96, supra note 333, at 1.
372. See id (detailing the review process and defining the commissioner as an
ombudsman who is "independent of the government"); INFO. COMM'R OF CAN.,
ANNUAL REPORT INFORMATiON COMWIISSIONER 1990-91, (1991) at 36 [hereinafter
ANNUAL REPORT 1990-91] (detailing the two levels of independent review under
the Access to Information Act).
The first level gives applicants the opportunity to ask the Information Commissioner
to investigate their complaints that the government has not responded properly to their
applications .... The second level provides the ground rules for asking the Federal
Court to review two types of decisions: government proposals to disclose third-party
information, and--once the Commissioner has completed his investigation--con-
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complaints, including the power to compell the review of documents.
He may not, however, order an agency to disclose documents.373
Thus, he must rely on persuasion to solve disputes. 74 If the Commis-
sioner believes that the government has wrongly denied access or the
appeal involves disclosure of third party information, he may ask the
Federal Court to review the denial.37 While the Canadian Ombuds-
man approach is criticized for its lack of power, the virtues of the ap-
proach are its informal, non-adversarial style, and expertise in free-
dom of information.37
6
Australia currently has all four approaches with some modifica-
tions. Initial review in Australia, like in the United States, is inter-
nally handled by the agency that denied the documents.377 Unlike the
United States, however, the individual must pay forty dollars for the
review.7 This form of review is considered the quickest and cheap-
plaints about improper denial of access.
Id.
373. See ANNUAL REPORT 1995-96, supra note 333, at 1 ("Since he is an om-
budsman, the commissioner may not.., order a complaint resolved in a particular
way."); CRITICAL REVIEW, supra note 355, at 42 (" The federal commissioner has
very strong investigative authority, but makes recommendations as to how to re-
solve differences over refusals of access."); 10 YEARS, supra note 336, at 11
(stating that the Commissioner's order powers "are not part of his repertoire...
[w]hile he is able to compel public servants to hand over information for review,
he can only make recommendations, not enforce decisions as to whether the in-
formation should be released").
374. See ANNUAL REPORT 1995-96, supra note 333, at 1.
375. See id. (noting that the Commissioner asks "for a federal court review only
if he believes an individual has been improperly denied access"). Of the 1,530
complaints reported to the Information Commissioner for the FY 1995-96, 13 were
filed in Federal Court. See id.
376. See generally 10 YEARS, supra note 336, at 10-12 (detailing the virtues and
disadvantages of Canada's Information Commissioner). From time to time in the
U.S., informal proposals have been made for an ombudsman based administrative
structure, along with calls for an independent administrative tribunal model. See
generally Mark H. Grunewald, Freedom of Information Act Dispute Resolution, 40
ADMIfN. L. REv. 1, n.5 (1988) (noting that the "most detailed proposal was made
by Robert L. Saloschin, former Director of the Office of Information Law and
Policy, Dep't of Justice" and providing additional examples of the use of an in-
formation ombudsman).
377. See generally ISSUES PAPER, supra note 7, at 8.1 (detailing the existing re-
view mechanisms in Australia).
378. Compare id, § 8.3 (stating that Australia charges forty dollars), with Fed-
eral Records, supra note 359, at 5 (stating that a fee is not required for internal re-
view).
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est, and the ALRC has recommended it remain the same.3" If the in-
dividual is still dissatisfied, he can either opt for a free Ombudsman
review or appeal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) at a
cost of three hundred dollars.380 Australia's Ombudsman is similar to
Canada's in that he can compel documents, but cannot overturn an
agency decision. Unlike Canada's Ombudsman, however, he has dis-
cretion to investigate a matter and may refer the appeal directly to the
AAT. aS' Many believe Australia's Ombudsman serves a valuable
function in investigating government agencies; the ALRC recom-
mends his role remain the same.a" Any further powers, such as the
ability to overturn agency decisions, may hinder the effectiveness of
his investigatory powers. 3 According to the ALRC, another effec-
tive review mechanism in Australia is the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal (AAT). 3" The AAT has jurisdiction for review under the
FOI act and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975.35 Thus,
the AAT handles more than just FOI appeals and is considered a
general tribunal.386 The AAT has the power to affirm, vary, or set
aside an agency decision.387 Additionally, it can review all agency
documents, but only at the tribunal hearing, not during the two pre-
liminary conferences that are required by law .38 Many have criti-
cized this aspect of the AAT, and the ALRC has recommended that
379. See DISCUsSION PAPER, supra note 341, at 98 (stating that a majority of
submissions favor internal review as the first stage).
380. See id at 98-101 (providing a thorough discussion of the review stages in
Australia under the Freedom of Information Act).
381. See id (describing the discretionary powers of the Ombudsman).
382. See id at 101 (proposing that the Ombudsman's role remain unchanged).
383. See DISCUssION PAPER, supra note 341, at 100 (stating that "[i]t is appar-
ent from submissions that the Ombudsman is performing a valuable function in
investigating agenc[ies] ... and determinative review powers" may significantly
affect the existing valuable role). The ALRC also bases its decision on the fact that
the Ombudsman investigates a wide range of matters relating to an agency's han-
dling of a FOI application, not just denied requests. See id
384. See id (reporting on the AAT).
385. See id; see also Administrative Appeals Tribunal Amendment Act, 1993
[hereinafter AAT Amdnts] (amending the AAT 1975).
386. See IssuES PAPER, supra note 7, at 101 (weighing the adVantages of a gen-
eral tribunal of diverse membership, flexibility to suit individual cases, and re-
duced costs versus the disadvantages of the lack of specialized FOI expertise and
lack of consistency in decisions).
387. See id (explaining that ATT must give reasons for its decisions as well).
388. See DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 341, at 106 (detailing the power of the
AAT to inspect documents).
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the AAT be granted the power to review documents during all stages
of appeal." 9 Additionally, many have criticized the AAT's lack of
power over conclusive certificates.39 Conclusive certificates are
similar to Britain's "public interest certificates" because they pro-
vide blanket protection to certain categories of information deemed
sensitive by ministers.39' The AAT cannot review a decision to grant
a conclusive certificate, but it can determine whether reasonable
grounds existed for the issuance of such a certificate.392 The ALRC
considered whether certificates were legitimate and the role that the
AAT should play in their review. The ALRC decided that the certifi-
cates are necessary and that the AAT may not revoke certificates, but
it can continue to assess whether ministers had reasonable grounds
for the certificate.393 Additionally, if the AAT believes that a certifi-
cate should be revoked and the minister disagrees, the minister must
advise Parliament by tabling a notice and then reading it in his or her
House.394 According to the ALRC, this "imposes a considerable and
sufficient discipline on Ministers."395 Overall, the AAT is considered
to be flexible, inexpensive, faster, and less formal than other ap-
proaches; yet, many say that the mechanism is too formal and adver-
sarial.39 6 Australians may also appeal to the Federal Courts if their
appeal is based on a "question of law."3 97 This type of review is rare,
and falls under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act
1977 rather than the FOI Act.398 Blair must decide which mecha-
389. See id. (requesting that section 64 of the Act be changed because "the Re-
view agrees that the AAT should be able to inspect the documents in dispute at any
stage"). This reform would allow the AAT to form its own view as to the sub-
stance of the claims for exemption at a very early point in the proceedings. See id.
390. See ISSUES PAPER, supra note 7, at 45 (asking "whether the provisions for
conclusive certificates are necessary and whether the AAT should be given power
to make determinative decisions?").
391. See id. (specifying that the Minister responsible for an agency has discre-
tion to grant a conclusive certificate for certain documents).
392. See id. (indicating the current way the AAT handles certificates).
393. See DIscussIoN PAPER, supra note 341, at 55 (stating that there is a legiti-
mate role for the certificates and noting that the expiration of the certificates after
two years is sufficient).
394. See id. (recommending this procedure as an additional safeguard).
395. Id.
396. See id. at 101-05 (providing an analysis of AAT review).
397. Id. at 101.
398. See ISSUES PAPER, supra note 7, at 97-98 (listing it as one of four possible
review mechanisms but not elaborating on it at length because it is not often used).
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nisms will be accepted by UK's Parliament and which will provide
the most access to government information.
D. EXEMPTIONS
As Canada's Information Commissioner stated in his 1993-1994
Annual Report: "Exemptions are difficult creatures to draft [and] [i]t
is even more difficult to obtain a consensus on what they should
be."3  The United States Congress agreed upon nine FOIA exemp-
tions,4 0 while Canada's Parliament affirmed fourteen °' and Austra-
lia's Parliament nineteen. °2 Of the three countries, Australia's ex-
emptions have received the most general criticism for being too
extensive and broad and containing complex statutory language. 3
399. ANNUAL REPORT 1993-94, supra note 348, at 16.
400. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994) (containing nine exemptions which protect
classified national defense and foreign relations information, internal agency rules
and practices, information prohibited from disclosure by another law, trade secrets
and confidential business information, inter-agency or intra-agency communica-
tions protected by legal privileges, information covering personal privacy, infor-
mation compiled for law enforcement purposes, information relating to the super-
vision of financial institutions and geological information).
401. See AIA, supra note 334, §§ 13-27 (providing 14 exemptions). These ex-
emptions are:
(13) information obtained in confidence; (14) federal provincial affairs; (15) interna-
tional affairs and defense; (16) law enforcement and investigations; (17) safety of in-
dividuals; (18) economic interests of Canada; (19) personal information; (20) third
party information; (21) Advice; (22) testing, audits (23) solicitor-client privilege; (24)
statutory prohibitions; (25) severability; (26) if information is to be published; (27)
notice to third parties.
Id
402. See FOI, supra note 349, §§ 33-47A (providing 19 exemptions). The ex-
emptions are:
(33) national security, defence or international relations; (33A) relations with states;
(34) cabinet documents; (36) internal working documents; (36A) periods for which
certificates remain in force; (37) law enforcement and public safety; (38) secrecy pro-
visions of enactment's apply; (39) documents affecting financial or property interests
of the Commonwealth (40) certain operations of agencies; (41) personal privacy; (42)
legal professional privilege; (43) documents relating to business affairs; (43A) docu-
ments relating to research; (44) national economy; (45) material obtained in confi-
dence; (46) disclosure of which would be in contempt of court or Parliament; (47)
documents arising out of companies and securities legislation; (47A) electoral rolls
and decisions.
Id
403. See ISSUES PAPER, supra note 7, at 34 (stating that the provisions "span
sixteen pages of the Act" and are "worded in such a way that they are neither ac-
cessible nor intelligible to most people").
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The ALRC has recommended that the Australian Parliament simplify
the language so that requesters and officials can better understand
and apply the statute." 4
An area of exemption shared by all three countries and highlighted
in Britain's debates is the protection of business information pro-
vided by third parties." 5 Such an exemption is necessary in order to
protect businesses from unfair business competition. 6 Exemption
four40 7 of the United States FOIA protects trade secrets and other
confidential business information; however, in order to further pro-
tect business contractors, the United States Congress passed a new
statute that contains provisions prohibiting agencies from releasing
certain information.4 8 Thus, this information now falls under the
protection of Exemption three of the FOIA as well as Exemption
four.4
0 9
In Australia, section forty-three protects business affairs. It is
comprised of two sections, one protecting trade secrets and the other
protecting information with a potentially diminishing commercial
value.410 The ALRC has recently recommended that the two exemp-
tions comprising section forty-three be repealed and combined.4 '
404. See DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 341, at 11 (agreeing that the language
and number of exemptions should be simplified).
405. See Fisher Arguments, supra note 1, at 585 (noting the importance of pro-
tecting commercial information).
406. See Ferris, supra note 352, at 44 (stating that "[t]he FOIA is not supposed
to release commercial secrets to the world").
407. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1994) (protecting "trade secrets and commercial
or financial material obtained from a person and privileged or confidential").
408. See New Statute Protects Contractor Proposals, FOIA UPDATE
(DOJ/Office of Information and Privacy, D.C.), Winter 1997, at 2 (explaining that
new provisions contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-210, 821, 110 Stat. 2422 provide even more protec-
tion for bid contractors under the FOIA).
409. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (3) (1994).
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this ti-
tle), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the pub-
lic in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular
criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters.
Id
410. See FOI, supra note 349, § 43 (protecting trade secrets, information with a
commercial value that could be destroyed or diminished, and certain information
the disclosure of which would reasonably affect a person).
411. See DIscussIoN PAPER, supra note 341, at 75 (stating that" [i]n accordance
with the desire to rationalise the exemption provisions, the Review proposes that
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Use of the access statue to monitor competitors is more prevalent in
Canada, even though the Act provides mandatory rather than discre-
tionary exemptions for trade secrets and commercial, scientific, and
technical information submitted in confidence to a government
agency.412 According to Canada's Information Commissioner, many
of the Act's delay problems concern requests for business informa-
tion.413 The Commissioner argues that the law should make details of
government contracts public because that would "put more account-
ability in the government contracting process." 4
1 4
Britain is also debating the protection of Cabinet confidences, an
area of information exempted from the Freedom of Information Acts
in the United States, Canada, and Australia. In the United States, Ex-
emption five" is used to "prevent injury to the quality of agency de-
cisions" by providing a "discretionary deliberative process privi-
lege.' 416 Generally, the exemption is used to encourage open
discussions on policy matters between high level and low level gov-
ernmental officials, protect against the disclosure of pre-decisional
policies, and protect against the disclosure of officials' reasons for
policies that were not, in fact, the reasons upon which final decisions
were made.41 '7 Accordingly, post-decisional documents do not fall
within Exemption five protection. Unlike the United States, Australia
adopted a mandatory, broader, class-based exemption that covers
specific types of Cabinet documents.411 "Once a document is deter-
§ 43(1)(a) and (b) be repealed").
412. See Tom Riley, US. Canadian Information Acts Differ, J. OF COM., Aug.
30, 1985 (discussing how Canada's Information Act provides mandatory exemp-
tions for trade secrets, as well as commercial, scientific, and technical information
submitted to the government). "Mandatory" means that if the information falls
within the exemption, it cannot be released; whereas, if the exemption is "discre-
tionary", it is up to the agency to decide if it can be released although it satisfies an
exemption. See generally Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979).
413. See ANNuAL REPORT 1993-94, supra note 348, at 24 (attributing delays to
business requests).
414. See id As of October 5, 1997, the Commissioner's reforms had not been
adopted. See id
415. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1994) (exempting "inter-agency or intra-agency
memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than
an agency in litigation with the agency").
416. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151 (1975).
417. See FOIA GUIDE, supra note 5, at 180 (pointing to the "three policy pur-
poses consistently ... held to constitute the basis for this privilege").
418. See FOI, supra note 349, § 34; see also THE INFO. COMM'R OF CAN., THE
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mined to be of the class described, it is exempt." ''  Much like under
United States Exemption Five, material must be pre-decisional to
qualify for exemption.4 20
Compared to the United States and Australia, Canada's approach
to cabinet confidences is "very much behind the times."4 2' As a re-
sult, the act continues to be viewed as a "secrecy law camouflaged in
the language of openness."4 22 Under the AIA, cabinet confidences
that have been in existence for less than twenty years are excluded
from coverage of the entire Act.423 A decade ago, the Standing
Committee on Justice and Solicitor General agreed that it was time to
replace the exclusion with an exemption bringing cabinet confi-
dences within the purview of the AIA.424 Experiences at the provin-
ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT AND CABINET CONFIDENCES: A DISCUSSION OF
NEW APPROACHES 16 (1996) [hereinafter INFORMATION COMMISSIONER] (detail-
ing Australia's Cabinet Confidence Exemption as a model for Canada). Specifi-
cally, the Report summarizes Australia's exemption 34:
The Australian Freedom of Information Act provides that each of the following docu-
ments is an exempt document: a document brought into existence for the purpose of
submission to the Cabinet which has been, or is proposed by a minister to be submitted
to Cabinet; an official record of Cabinet; a copy or an extract from a document cov-
ered above; and a document, the discussion of which would involve the disclosure of
many deliberation or decision of the Cabinet, other than a document by which a deci-
sion of the Cabinet was officially disclosed.
Id.
419. See INFORMATION COMMISSIONER, supra note 418, at 16.
420. See id.
421. See id. at 1.
422. Id. at 3.
423. See id. at 2 (detailing the information that is excluded under the Act). Sub-
section 69(1) of Canada's AIA provides that the Act does not apply to confidences
of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada, including:
(a) memoranda the purpose of which is to present proposals or recommendation to
Council; (b) discussion papers the purpose of which is to present background explana-
tions, analyses of problems or policy options to Council for consideration by Council
in making decisions; (c) agenda of Council or records recording deliberations or deci-
sions of Council; (d) records used for or reflecting communications or discussions
between ministers of the Crown on matters relating to the making of government deci-
sions or the formulation of government policy; (e) records the purpose of which is to
brief ministers of the Crown in relation to matters that are brought before, or are pro-
posed to be brought before, Council or that are the subject of communications or dis-
cussions referred to in paragraph (d); (f) draft legislation; and (g) records that contain
information about the contents of any record within a class of records referred to in
paragraphs (a) to (f).
Id. at 1-2.
424. See INFORMATION COMMISSIONER, supra note 418, at 40 (referring to the
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A. FORMS OF ACCESS
In the interest of simplicity and comprehensibility, Blair should
employ the term "records" rather than "information." "Records"
should be defined broadly, as in the United States, to include various
types of media and up-to-date technology. 429 By removing the term
"information," it will be clear to British ministers that persons are
entitled to actual physical documents rather than prepared summa-
ries. Including a broad form of access will also prevent ministers
from communicating in certain formats to avoid the law.430
B. FEES AND COSTS
In order to prevent the use of costs as a deterrent to access, as is
currently the case under the Code, no fees should be charged for the
request for information.43' Although Canada and Australia believe
that such fees are necessary,432 the United States experience proves
otherwise.433 Similar to all three countries, fees should be charged for
search and retrieval, inspection and photocopying, and decision-
making, subject to fee waivers. An independent administrative
monitor should be created to ensure the most efficient handling of
requests.' The independent monitor should not be involved in the
429. See Cabinet Office (OPS) Press Office, Clark Outlines Vision For Elec-
tronic Government, June 18, 1997, (visited July 18, 1994) <http'J/ww.open.
gov.uk/coi/cab/34/97.html> (announcing the Government's commitment to "revi-
talise government by harnessing new technology to provide, simpler, efficient and
responsive services"). David Clark, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, an-
nounced that "clever use of Information Technology will reduce the traditional
boundaries between government departments... Technology will provide a sim-
ple and efficient link to any Government Agency or function." Id. Thus, the im-
plementation of a Freedom of Information Act along the lines of the U.S. seems
perfectly reasonable.
430. See supra note 188 (explaining that MPs threaten to conduct all business
over the telephone in order to avoid the reach of an access statute).
431. See supra note 311 (discussing the fact that high fees charged under the
Code of Practice on Access to Government Office are a deterrent to the use of the
Code).
432. See DIScUssION PAPER, supra note 341, at 83-90; see also 10 YEARS, su-
pra note 336, at 21.
433. See supra note 359 (explaining the United States' fee system which does
not charge an initial application fee).
434. See supra note 358 (discussing the ALRC's recommendation that an inde-
pendent person oversee the administration of its FOI Act).
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cial level in Canada should support the calls for reform at the federal
level, since mandatory exceptions for Cabinet confidences have been
enacted provincially and have "not had any significant impact on the
effectiveness of the collective decision-making of these Cabinets."4 5
Although the United States provisions provide the greatest degree of
access, they may not be appropriate in Britain, given its style of gov-
ernment.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
In providing recommendations to Blair on a freedom of informa-
tion statute, it is imperative to remember the pervasive governmental
secrecy that exists in Britain and the particular constitutional frame-
work within which Blair must work.426 Blair is fighting tradition by
shifting access to information from the government to the people. As
expressed throughout the Parliamentary debates, many are concerned
that the tenets of Britain's Parliamentary democracy will be injured
by an access statute.427 Experiences in Canada and Australia dispel
such notions, but in view of these concerns it will be necessary for
Blair to include a preamble similar to that recommended by the
ALRC.4 28 This preamble will demonstrate to the government, Par-
liament, and the people that Britain is committed to providing its
citizens with statutory rights of access to information while main-
taining important British concepts like Ministerial Accountability,
Crown Privilege, and Parliamentary Democracy. All provisions fol-
lowing this preamble should build upon this concept. A sample of the
type of provisions that Blair's statute should contain are as follows.
Report entitled Open and Shut: Enhancing the Right to Know and the Right to Pri-
vacy).
425. Id. at 26.
426. See supra Part L.A (discussing Britain's unwritten constitution, Westmin-
ister style of government, and the Government's adherence to the doctrines of
Ministerial Accountability and Crown Privilege).
427. See supra notes 33, 129, 282 (detailing Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's
and other MPs views that a freedom of information act would threaten Ministerial
Accountability and Crown Privilege).
428. See supra note 344 and accompanying text (providing the ALRC's recom-
mendation that Australia's FOI Act include a preamble).
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appellate review process; rather, its role should be limited to ensuring
that the proper technology is in place at all agencies so that informa-
tion can be provided in its cheapest form. Additionally, this inde-
pendent monitor should tour agencies and examine their administra-
tive procedures and report to Parliament.435 Blair might consider
forming a freedom of information Parliamentary committee to work
with the independent monitor to ensure that records are not destroyed
and that agencies are complying with the letter and spirit of the
law.436 Moreover, this proposal would complement the principle of
Ministerial Accountability, since ministers would be responsible to
Parliament for their agencies' administrative procedures.
C. REVIEW MECHANISMS
As suggested by Fisher and employed in the United States, Aus-
tralia, and the United Kingdom, internal review should be the first
stage of review and a prerequisite to all other stages.437 Internal re-
view is inexpensive and quick, and it allows the government to re-
view its policies.438 The second stage should be an investigation by
an independent Parliamentary Ombudsman. Unlike the Ombudsman
used in Britain under the Code, and in Canada, this Ombudsman
should have determinative powers and the power to compel disclo-
sure of records. Experience at the local level shows that an Ombuds-
man with mere recommendatory powers will be ignored.439 The Om-
budsman should not be the current Parliamentary Commissioner for
Administration because he is in charge of too many measures. An of-
ficial Information Commissioner should be created whose role is
limited to freedom of information."0 Finally, and importantly, the
435. See supra note 358 (listing the creation of a Parliamentary Committee to
supervise its FOI Act as one of the ALRC's proposals).
436. See supra note 250 and accompanying text (explaining that government
officials regardless of their party will seek to withhold embarrassing information).
437. See supra notes 244, 368 (detailing the internal review mechanism pro-
posed under Fisher's Right to Know Bill and the United States' initial internal de-
partmental review procedure).
438. See ISSUES PAPER, supra note 7, at 69 (showing effectiveness of Australia's
internal review mechanism).
439. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text (providing recent argu-
ments that Parliament amend the Local Government (Access to Information) Act
to include an apellate procedure).
440. See supra note 376. The proposed Information Commissioner's expertise
should resemble the level maintained by the Canadian Information Commissioner
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last stage of review should take place in the courts. Freedom of in-
formation case law will further control the government's proper dis-
closure of official information. As evidenced in the Ponting trial, the
judicial system is willing and ready to take on the role and serve as a
further check on the Executive." Judicial intervention should not be
considered incompatible with Ministerial Accountability because
Ministers will have had the opportunity to plead their cases and re-
spond to Parliament at the lower stages.
D. EXEMPTIONS
In order to avoid confusion, the statutory language of the exemp-
tions should be clear."2 The number of exemptions should be kept to
a minimum in order to reinforce that this is an access law-not a se-
crecy law. In order to win support for his measure, Blair should not
adopt the business recommendations proposed in Canada; rather, he
should protect businesses and at the same time provide limited access
to certain types of information as in the United States. With respect
to cabinet documents, Blair should follow the lead of Australia and
make the exemption mandatory. Such a provision will allow the can-
dor of policy discussion to remain.
One final policy issue that must be addressed is whether the Offi-
cial Secrets Act ought to be repealed." 3 Such an action is necessary
in order to demonstrate that the Government is committed to official
openness rather than official secrecy. Because Canada has an Official
Secrets Act in place along with its access statute, it can be argued
that Britain could retain its statute as well.444 If that is the case, the
Official Secrets Act would have to be amended allowing officials to
disclose certain information.445 As a final recommendation, the name
of the act should be as Fisher suggested, "The Right to Know." This
of Canada.
441. See Maurice Frankel, Britain's Secret Society, GUARDIAN, Jan. 26, 1993, at
18 (reiterating that "judges are becoming increasingly critical of official secrecy").
442. See supra notes 403-04 (explaining the criticism that Australia's FOI Act
receives for its numerous exemptions and difficult language).
443. See supra note 22 (discussing the pivotal role of the Official Secrets Act in
maintaing Britain's governmental secrecy).
444. See supra note 338 (noting Canada's Official Secrets Act).
445. See id. If Britain were to amend its Official Secrets Act it should use Can-
ada's Official Secrets Act as a model, limiting it solely to espionage offense provi-
sions. See id.
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name helps inculcate the attitudes of openness that are so difficult tolegislate.'
CONCLUSION
Governments have become the custodians of information which
can profoundly affect the lives of individual citizens." 7 That is why
"access to government information is essential by right, not by the
grace and favor of Government officials."" 8 History has shown in
Britain that voluntary openness does not provide the necessary dis-
closure of information which often times leads to tragedies. A British
"Right to Know Act" will provide greater access, make government
more accountable, and enhance Britain's parliamentary democracy.
446. See supra notes 286-88 and accompanying text (providing MPs arguments
that attitudes towards openness must occur naturally since mandating openess
could lead to greater secrecy).
447. See Annual Report 1995-96, supra note 333, at 3 (justifying freedom of
information and in particular statutory rights of access).
448. Id
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